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english settlement and local governance
mary sarah bilder
In late 1584, as Sir Walter Raleigh began to organize an effort to send
settlers to Roanoke Island, an anonymous author asked, “What manner of
geouernement is to be vsed and what offics to geouerne?”1 The mysterious
end to the Roanoke settlement offers no answer. Yet, as the vast record of
charters, letters patent, and correspondence about governance testifies, the
manner of government preoccupied settlers, investors, and Crown officials.
The question of governance also intrigued past generations of historians.
Simply put, when English settlement began in the 1570s, not one of the
institutions that symbolized American representative government was in
existence; by the 1720s, colonial American institutional development was
largely complete.
For the casual reader, institutional histories of early America often revel
in overly obscure details of colonial and English political organization. The
current tendency to reject the entire venture, however, goes too far the other
way. As we shall see, institutional history is important for two reasons. First,
it helps us understand the development of authority – in this case, the roots
of American federalism and representative democracy. Second, it helps us
put British North America in its transatlantic context as part of English
politics, the expanding English empire, and the Atlantic world.
For much of the past century, with notable exceptions, early American
historians have shied away from institutional history. We can attribute this
shift in part to the quantity and quality of work written in the first half
of the twentieth century by the “imperial school” of colonial historians.
Their detailed accounts of colonial American institutional development
in an English world, crowned by Charles McClean Andrews’ magnificent
four-volume The Colonial Period of American History (1934–8), seemed defini-
tive. The foundations apparently set, succeeding generations of historians
1 “Anonymous Notes for the Guidance of Raleigh and Cavendish” (1584–1585) in David
Beers Quinn, ed., The Roanoke Voyages (London,1955), 1: 136.
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64 Mary Sarah Bilder
turned to different concerns. In part, too, for the imperial school histori-
ans – mostly born in the nineteenth century and raised in a nation whose
governing structure had been torn apart and remade and which had then
embarked on its own imperial expansion – the colonial period encouraged
institutional explanations for contemporary questions, such as regional dif-
ferences, discussions of legitimate and illegitimate colonial and imperial
policies, and theories of American democratic identity. Later historians,
raised in a nation with an apparently unalterable governmental structure
but torn by social tensions, looked to the colonial period for insights into
different matters – the problems of the modern “United States”: economics
and class, politics and ideology, social relations, race, gender, sexuality, and
cultural practices.
Although historians turned away from writing institutional history, the
questions relating to it have never disappeared. The arrangement of power
and authority that developed over the first century of English coloniza-
tion remains a central, inescapable theme in American history. Yet, our
approach to these questions has necessarily changed. Interpretations and
theories about historical development become dated; the insights that pro-
duce interpretive originality carry intentional or unconscious oversights. In
its way this chapter is no exception, for the reader will find that I advance
here my own argument about a certain “American manner of government.”
But in fact my main concern is not to construct a particular, new interpre-
tive approach. Rather, I hope to suggest the ways in which old questions
about governance retain their vitality and interest.
To this end, the chapter retraces the classic institutional narrative, focus-
ing on moments where a reexamination disrupts conventional expectations.
The theme is simple. Institutions of government are not preordained. Gov-
ernance practices are contingent and embedded in particular contexts, and
institutional labels and meanings change over time. A revitalized institu-
tional history hence should focus on offices, officers, and the “manner of
government” of the early colonial period. So pursued, institutional history
reveals law as an instrument of governance and a rhetoric of authority – a
discourse about legitimating and also contesting power.
In focusing on governance and authority, I suggest that we should reverse
our traditional understanding. We have recognized that both in England
and in the North American settlements concerns about the location of
authority lay at the center of seventeenth-century English institutional
development. But we have approached debates over authority as if there
could be only one authority. What is striking about the early colonial
period, however, is the centrality of the practice (and hence the problem) of
the delegation of authority and the recurrence of developments that created
dual authorities and then embraced their inherent tensions. To put it simply,
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English Settlement and Local Governance 65
for the first century and a half, English governance in America was imperium
in imperio.
Two final preliminaries. First, I focus here on the mainland settlements
that eventually become the United States. Additional coverage of Canadian
and Caribbean English settlements – the Newfoundland fishing communi-
ties, the proprietary colony of Barbados, the long-lived corporation colony of
Bermuda, the royal colony of Jamaica, all of which remained longer within
the British empire and British imperial governance practices –would rein-
force the argument that dual authorities were not inherently unmanageable.
Second, I have chosen the agenda for this chapter recognizing how influ-
ential the tendency to frame discussions by current institutional assump-
tions remains. Conventional approaches usually discuss colonial institutions
under an executive-legislative-judicial model – that is, starting from the
premise that powers can and need be separated. The courts, however, were
not a separate branch, and the controversy was whether courts were to
be controlled by the legislature or the Crown through the governor. In
fact, for most of the colonial period, the “third branch” was the English
Crown and Privy Council. To emphasize these understandings, the Privy
Council appears as part of governance and the courts as part of the culture
of law.
I. SETTLING COLONIES
Discoursing on patterns of colonial settlement often precedes discussion of
governance. However, because the Crown began to delegate governmental
authority long before any settlements arose, governance is an inescapable
foundation for settlement. Yet, English settlement in North America did
not proceed according to any preconceived master plan established by the
Crown, or private individuals, or groups of investors. Discovery, trade,
and military outposts, not settlement, were the initial goals in explor-
ing North America. Ireland, not North America, was the first site for
English colonization and plantation. Nonetheless, all the initial English
efforts at exploration required a delegation of the Crown’s governmental
authority.
Early delegations occurred in letters patent, grants under seal by which
the Crown gave privileges and authority but did not necessarily consti-
tute any particular political entity. Patent referred to the open or public
nature of the grant. Letters patent usually began with the words, “To all
to whom these presents shall come, greeting.” In 1496, Henry VII gave
John Cabot (Giovanni Caboto) the first English letters patent over land
in North America. The Latin words of the document implicitly delegated
governance in that Cabot and his sons were enabled to conquer, “occupy and
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possess” lands as “vassals and governors lieutenants and deputies.”2 Soon
after, letters patent given to Bristol merchants in 1501 and 1502 contained
explicit delegations of governance authority, but did not address the spe-
cific structure of government. The patentees received authority to govern
and to establish laws, ordinances, statutes, and proclamations for good and
peaceful government.
Historians tend to use charter as a generic term to refer to the Crown’s
grants for mainland settlements. In fact, most of these documents were let-
ters patent and referred to themselves as such. Technically and traditionally,
letters patent and charters are somewhat different documents. A charter was
a grant of privileges in perpetuity; it was more formal, with more witnesses,
written in Latin and, until the early sixteenth century, filed in the Charter
Rolls. The first documents of North American settlement that explicitly
referred to themselves as charters came not as we might expect with the
early corporate colonies, but with the first proprietary colonies, followed
by the 1644 Parliamentary charter to Rhode Island. Before 1660, contem-
poraries usually talked not of charters but of patents and of their holders
as patentees. Indeed, the etymology of patent as a term referring to land
conferred by letters patent can be traced to this specific North American
context. Only after 1660 did colonists and English officials begin to refer
consistently to foundational documents as charters.
In discussions of the substance of the letters patents and charters, the
temptation has been to identify the charters as proto-democratic constitu-
tions. Most gave inhabitants the right to the liberties, franchises, immu-
nities, and privileges of free denizens and natural subjects as if born in
England. Several provided for land to be held relatively free of feudal obli-
gations. In legal terms, land was to be granted in a technical form: as of
the Manor at East Greenwich in the County of Kent in free and common
socage and not in capite nor in knights service. Free and common socage
meant that the land was to be held in fee simple with limited payments
(for example, one-fifth of the gold or a certain number of beaver skins).
Many proprietary charters, however, did not envision a settlement of free-
holding inhabitants. Although by the early seventeenth century, English
landholders largely held land directly from the Crown, these charters per-
mitted land to be held with feudal services and rents owed to a lord. Such
grants contradicted the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum (1290), which had
initiated the decline of English feudalism by permitting the sale of land
without penalty, and in fact, these charters explicitly rejected application of
2 All quotations from charters and patents unless otherwise noted are from Francis New-
ton Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic
Laws . . . , (1909; reprint, Buffalo, 1993).
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the statute. The proprietary charters thus affected to resurrect feudal land-
holding practices. Letters patent and charters were compatible with both
feudal and freeholding practices.
The Corporation Colony
In narratives of English settlement, the corporate form is a crucial compo-
nent of the American institutional story. The corporation’s role, however,
was not necessarily that which has been emphasized. Certainly, the corpora-
tion provided a mechanism for delegating governance authority to private
individuals. Ironically, however, the corporation’s failings as a delegated
authority and its reinvention as an independent authority would be its
lasting contributions to American colonial governance.
Discussions of the corporation as a vehicle for settlement often have
implied that the corporation and corporate governance were stable legal
forms. The corporate form, however, was itself developing as settlement
began. Corporations were created by means of letters patent granting the
privilege of incorporation. By the mid-sixteenth century, incorporation sig-
naled a particular set of privileges: the capacity to sue and be sued, possession
of a seal, perpetual succession, the power to hold lands, and the power to
pass bylaws. The use of this form for overseas trade remained haphazard.
The first joint-stock trading company was the Muscovy Company, created
in 1555, with governors, assistants, and a collective fellowship empowered
to pass statutes, acts, and ordinances. Other joint-stock trading companies
developed slowly in the late sixteenth century: the Merchant Adventur-
ers, the Eastland (Baltic) Company, the Levant or Turkey Company, and
the East India Company. But it was not until John Wheeler’s account of
the Merchant Adventurers, A Treatise of Commerce (1601), that the struc-
ture of corporate governance began to acquire a stable cultural definition
as a governor, deputy governor, and twenty-four assistants with “politike
gouernement, lawes, and orders.”3
Incorporation did not require this particular form of governance. Bor-
oughs, for example, were also incorporated entities. As England shifted
from a feudal society to one in which increasingly power came directly
from the Crown, boroughs repeatedly requested new Crown charters. But
the restructuring these bodies politic sought was not uniform. Not until the
1660s did corporate boroughs begin to possess relatively similar munici-
pal governmental charters. Instead, borough corporations retained their
older municipal offices (such as mayor, high steward, bailiff, and recorder)
and governance practices. After the Corporation Act (1661) restricted
3 John Wheeler, A Treatise of Commerce (London, 1601), 24.
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corporate offices to those who were willing to participate in the Angli-
can Communion, borough corporations came to symbolize sectarianism
in English governance. In neither respect, then, were seventeenth-century
English models of corporate governance for local government necessarily
“democratic.”
The first attempt to use the legal form of the corporation for purposes
of colonization reveals the delegated authority underlying corporate gover-
nance. In the 1560s, Sir Humphrey Gilbert became interested in English
settlement in Ireland. In 1568–9, Gilbert requested privileges to make “a
Corporat Towne” in Munster. Gilbert’s interest lay in self-governance: the
power “to make Sutch statutes and lawes as shall seeme good to their dis-
crecions, for the better ordring of them selves, and their people, those being
agreeable to the lawes of this Realme.” The “chieften of this company”
was to have power to make “laws and ordinances, not contrary to the laws
of Ireland.”4 The Crown granted Gilbert letters patent with lawmaking
authority limited by the laws of England. By the late sixteenth century,
corporations in general were understood to be similarly bound.
Gilbert kept alive the idea of lawmaking authority limited by the laws
of England while aspiring to create a more feudal-style settlement in New-
foundland where English fisheries for catching and drying salt cod existed.
In 1578, he obtained letters patent that gave him “full and meere power
and authoritie to correct, punish, pardon, governe and rule” with laws “for
the better governement of the said people,” but “as neere as conveniently
may, agreeable to the forme of the lawes & pollicy of England.” Gilbert
claimed the area for the Crown in 1583, but his death on the voyage home
ended his scheme.
We can conceptualize this formula of lawmaking authority bounded by
the laws of England as a constitutionally limited delegation of governance.
The formula appeared in letters patent and charters, as well as in royal
instructions, commissions, internal delegations of authority, gubernatorial
correspondence, colonial laws, court proceedings, and appeals to the Privy
Council. The precise language varied, as did the various types of colonial
lawmaking that were contemplated: laws, statutes, ordinances, constitu-
tions, acts, orders, bylaws, rules, methods, directions, instructions, as well as
court proceedings, procedures, and penalties. Common variations included
“not contrary,” “be as near as conveniently may, agreeable,” and “not repug-
nant.” Many versions included a repugnancy principle (colonial laws could
4 Requests of Sir Warham St. Leger . . . Humphrey Gilbert, et al., The Voyages and Colonising
Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, ed. David Beers Quinn (Hakluyt Society, 1940; reprint,
Nendeln, 1967), 1: 122–124; Petition to the Privy Council (1569) and “A brief of thinges
allowable . . . (1569), 493–6.
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not be repugnant to the laws of England), as well as an explicit or implicit
divergence principle (the laws could diverge for local circumstances). Simi-
lar variations on the “laws of England” appeared. The phrase included “laws
and statutes,” but “government,” “customs,” “policy,” “proceedings,” and
“rights” also might appear. Eventually the formula was understood to bind
even self-authorized settlements: the 1641 Piscataqua River settlers gave
their freemen lawmaking authority “not repugnant to the laws of England.”
Although the corporate form offered the capacity to raise funds, adapting
the corporate governance of the trading companies to transatlantic settle-
ments was a different story, as Gilbert’s half-brother, Sir Walter Ralegh
(Raleigh), discovered in attempting to use the corporation to govern a settle-
ment. Raleigh’s first attempt in 1585 to settle Roanoke Island failed within
a year. The letters patent had granted constitutionally limited lawmaking
authority, but had made no provision for specific forms of governance. In his
second attempt, Raleigh delegated his authority to a “Bodye pollitique &
Corporate,” the governor and assistants of the City of Raleigh in Virginia.5
Reflecting the settlement’s intended future social hierarchy, the governor,
John White, and the twelve assistants were each given a coat of arms. Cor-
porate governance was divided, with three assistants remaining in England
while the others and approximately 100 men, women, and children sailed to
Roanoke. The need for additional supplies brought White back to England
in 1587, but the fragmented corporate structure and the following year’s
fight against the Armada foiled fundraising efforts. A new company was
created to raise funds for a relief effort in 1590, but by then the settlement
had vanished. Whatever the fate of the settlers, Raleigh’s colleague Thomas
Hariot pointed out that there was “noe especiall example” of a corporation
for planting that had “proued well.”6
Difficulties with the corporate form continued. In 1606, James I granted
letters patent for two companies (the Virginia Company of London and the
Virginia Company of Plymouth) and two colonies. The Plymouth Company
undertook only one venture. In 1607, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and George
Popham organized 120 settlers to land in Sagadahoc (Maine). The corporate
structure remained in England. Difficulties with supplies, bad weather, and,
perhaps most important, the governor’s return to England ended the colony
a year later. Another small corporation, the London and Bristol Company,
fared no better. Its settlement under John Guy at Cuper’s Cove, Newfound-
land, in 1610 declined after Guy returned to England several years later. By
1620, disenchantment with the corporate form led the Plymouth arm of
5 The Roanoke Voyages, 2: 508.
6 “Thomas Hariot’s Notes on Corporations for Trade and Plantations” (n.d.) in The Roanoke
Voyages, 1: 389.
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the Virginia Company to reorganize as the Council for New England with
authority transferred to a small group of titled lords.
Even when a settlement survived, governing it through a London-based
corporation proved difficult. The Virginia Company of London encoun-
tered repeated governance problems. The initial letters patent created a
multi-layered delegation of authority: a Crown-appointed London council,
a resident council, and a requirement that the council’s laws be signed by the
Crown. In 1607, 104 men set forth to found Jamestown. In barely enough
time for the news to travel to England and back, never mind any laws
to be approved, disease and starvation reduced the colony by two-thirds.
In 1609, the company reincorporated with a single London council that
held constitutionally limited lawmaking authority and was to delegate this
authority to an appointed governor. Under a strict martial code, the 1611
Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall, &c., Governors Sir Thomas Gates and
Sir Thomas Dale stabilized the settlement. But their discretionary author-
ity seemed contrary to the corporate form, so in 1612, new letters patent
returned lawmaking authority to the London corporation’s general court.
Now, the Virginia settlers were left with insufficient discretion. In 1618,
the Company issued a “greate Charter or commission of privileges, orders,
and laws,” delegating its authority to a subsidiary political corporation with
a council and assembly of elected representatives.7 The first assembly met
at Jamestown in July 1619. According to the 1621 ordinance, laws were to
be ratified and confirmed in England and the assembly required “to imitate
and follow the Policy of the Form of Government, Laws, Customs, and
Manner of Trial, and other Administration of Justice, used in the Realm
of England, as near as may be, even as ourselves, by his Majesty’s Letters
Patent, are required.”
This corporation-within-a-corporation was, theoretically, a coherent
model for London-based governance, but the only settlement actually gov-
erned that way was Bermuda. In 1612, a subsidiary venture of the Virginia
Company settled Bermuda and incorporated in 1615 as the London-based
Governor and Company of the Somer Islands (the Bermuda Company). In
1619, Bermuda followed Virginia in encouraging settlement with company
instructions to establish an assembly for local governance with the power to
make laws not “repugnant to the laws of England,” the governor’s instruc-
tions, or any company laws and subject to confirmation by the company.
The assembly convened in 1620, and until 1684 Bermuda was governed as
a corporation-within-a-corporation.
No other London-based corporation governed a settlement successfully.
The Virginia Company’s financial difficulties were a constant liability for
7 Susan Myra Kingsbury, The Records of the Virginia Company of London (Washington, 1906),
3: 158.
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the settlement, and in 1624 the Crown repealed its letters patent by writ
of quo warranto, a procedure used to revoke borough corporate charters. Quo
warranto (“by what authority”) accused the corporation of acting outside its
charter. In 1625, the new King, Charles I, proclaimed that the government
of Virginia would “depend upon Our Selfe.”8 The governor became a Crown
appointee bound by Crown instructions. Yet, although the corporation no
longer existed and the assembly’s legal status was in some doubt, corporate
practices continued. In 1629, answers to a set of propositions seemed to
confirm authorization of a “grand assembly to ordain laws.”9 In 1639,
Crown instructions at last specifically acknowledged that the governor and
assembly held lawmaking authority so long as its laws were as near as
may be to the laws of England. Virginia became a royal colony after 1676,
when that designation came to signify a new institutional form that would
become dominant in the English settlements. Before then, Virginia looked
more like a corporate colony in which the Crown had simply substituted
itself for the London corporation.
Virginia was not the only settlement in which the maintenance of cor-
porate governance practices – not necessarily the legal corporate entity –
was understood to confer self-governing authority. The English separatists
in Leyden, the Pilgrims, were not a corporation as such. London-based
investors met as a company with a president and treasurer while the planters
sailed off with a governor. Nonetheless, the settlers asserted self-governing
authority analogous to corporate authority in a combination (later known
as the Mayflower Compact) signed after the Mayflower landed outside any
authorizing letters patent. The Plymouth leaders in 1629 obtained a patent
from the Council of New England that allowed them to “incorporate by
some usual or fitt name” and make orders, ordinances, and constitutions,
“not repugnante to the lawes of Englande,” and the 1636 laws referred to
Plymouth as a corporation. A governor and assistants were to be elected at a
general court, and laws passed. By 1640, Bradford surrendered all authority
under the patent to the “Freeman of this Corporacon of New Plymouth.”
Plymouth’s experience suggested that corporate lawmaking authority
could be acquired by self-governance practices. The same desire for self-
governance without regard to formal corporate status appears also in Mas-
sachusetts Bay. In 1629, a company was incorporated as the Governour and
Company of the Massachusetts Bay, a “Bodie politique and corporate” with
letters patent based on the defunct 1612 Virginia document but emphasiz-
ing local government. A governor, deputy governor, and eighteen assistants
8 Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations Relating to America, 1603–1783
(Worcester, 1911), 53.
9 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1574–1660, ed. W. Noel
Sainsbury (1860; reprint, Vaduz, 1964), 1: 100.
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elected by the freemen would take care of the plantation and “Government
of the People there,” with constitutionally limited lawmaking authority.
The location of government worried Massachusetts Bay leaders. From
the outset, the corporate form made the settlement vulnerable to dissent-
ing shareholders and the Crown. As conditions in England worsened for
Puritans, a minority of shareholders successfully voted to transfer the gov-
ernment of the settlement to the inhabitants in New England. This transfer
alleviated the need for a corporation-within-a-corporation and placed the
physical distance of the Atlantic between settlement governance and the
Crown. Without such a transfer, a similar settlement in Providence Island
(near Nicaragua) under a similar letters patent failed by 1641.
The sectarian leaders of Massachusetts Bay clung to a belief in corpo-
rate self-governance while treating English laws governing corporations
as avoidable technicalities. Repeatedly, Crown officials and some colonists
challenged the colony’s authority. A year into settlement, Massachusetts
Bay leaders restricted participation in corporate governance by requiring
that freemen be male members of an approved colony church. Between
1635 and 1637, the Crown conducted quo warranto proceedings to revoke
the letters patent; however, the writ was not served. Meanwhile, to bol-
ster sectarian governance, the government tried and banished recalcitrants:
Roger Williams, Anne Hutchinson, and John Wheelwright. In 1638, the
corporation was told to send the patent to the Crown, but Governor John
Winthrop refused to do so.
Meanwhile, events in England lessened the threat from the Crown, but
raised new challenges. In 1646, Robert Child argued that as all corporations
were subject to the laws of England, English laws now favorable to Presby-
terians should be followed; this argument was unsuccessful. When Puritan
sympathizers took over the English government, the colony’s governance
practices were left alone. In 1648, the colony’s first published law code,
The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes, proclaimed the general court’s
authority over its inhabitants. By the 1660s, the colony coined money, exe-
cuted Quakers, denied appeals to the Crown, required oaths of fidelity, and
ignored English trade laws. Over three decades, the colony’s sectarian cor-
porate governance practices and lawmaking authority surpassed the legal
limits of the corporate form.
The perception that corporate governance practices created lawmaking
authority – in essence, a government – appears also in Connecticut. In the
late 1630s, Puritans similar to those in Massachusetts Bay founded the
towns of Connecticut. At first, settlers struggled over the precise termi-
nology for the self-authorized governments. In 1639, Connecticut referred
to itself both as a “Publike State or Commonwelth” and a “Combination
and Confederation.” That same year, New Haven – founded by settlers of
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a particular political-religious bent – chose a “civil government, accord-
ing to God” under a “plantation covenant.” Soon, however, both adopted
the governance practices of Massachusetts Bay, and in 1643 Connecticut,
New Haven, Massachusetts Bay, and Plymouth united under “Articles of
Confederation in a “firm and perpetual league of friendship” as the United
Colonies of New England.
The sectarian tendencies of these corporate-type governments have not
always been appreciated. Yet, many dissenters who fled the Massachusetts
Bay colony initially chose other political forms of self-governance. Prov-
idence, for example, followed a “government by way of Arbitration” and
insisted on “liberty of Conscience.” When Portsmouth and Newport later
adopted the corporate practices of a governor, deputy governor, and freemen,
they insisted on the absence of religious limitation, declaring “the Govern-
ment which this Bodie Politick doth attend . . . is a DEMOCRACIE, or
Popular Government.” The “Body of Freemen orderly assembled” had the
power “to make or constitute Just Lawes.” The governmental authority
of the corporation was separated from particular governance practices in
Rhode Island’s “free Charter of Civil Incorporation and Government,” the
first to incorporate a preexisting, self-governed settlement. The Parliamen-
tary commissioners granting the 1644 charter gave the towns the “full
Power and Authority to rule themselves” by “voluntary consent of all, or
the greater Part of them” as was “most suitable to their Estate and Condi-
tion.” The towns chose to elect a president, four assistants, and deputies. In
1647, the assembly emphasized the nonsectarian nature of its government
as “DEMOCRATICALL . . . a Government held by the free and voluntarie
consent of all, or the greater parte of the free Inhabitants.”10
By the 1660s, corporate governance practices and a corporate charter
or letters patent had come to symbolize constitutionally limited self-
governance. This understanding led to the incorporation of Connecticut
and Rhode Island. With the Restoration of Charles II, both colonies grew
concerned about their political authority. Connecticut had no authorizing
document and, in 1662, quickly obtained letters patent from Charles II.
The towns became the “Body Corporate and politique” of the “Governor
and Company of the English colony of Connecticut.” Rhode Island thought
it advisable to replace its Parliamentary charter with new letters patent –
referred to by Rhode Islanders as a “charter” – with “full libertie in reli-
gious concernements.” Like Connecticut, the colony was incorporated as a
Governor and Company (governor, deputy governor, and assistants chosen
by the freemen) with constitutionally limited lawmaking authority. The
10 John Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island (Providence, 1856)
[hereinafter R.I. Colony Recs.], 1: 156.
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charter affirmed the colony’s “livlie experiment” in religious liberty. Rhode
Island was now “Company, Corporation and Collony.”11
The incorporation of Rhode Island and Connecticut meant formal recog-
nition of the institution of the corporation colony: a political document,
explicitly called a charter, incorporated the government (the Governor
and Company), corporate officers (governor and assistants) were elected by
freemen, and the assembly held lawmaking authority limited by the laws
of England. In theory, incorporation placed the settlements under English
law, limited their lawmaking authority, and made them vulnerable to quo
warranto proceedings. In reality, as Edward Randolph criticized, incorpo-
ration made the New England colonies “Independent Governm[en]ts.”12
Self-governing corporate authority on the far side of the Atlantic circum-
vented English corporate laws and English Crown control. After 1663, no
more corporation colonies were created.
Seeds of American institutions can be found in this story of corporate
governance – but not necessarily the expected ones. Corporate authority the-
oretically required prior delegation of authority from the Crown, but the
repeated failure of corporations for settlement and the development instead
of self-authorized settlements with corporate governance practices created
the perception that a government based on corporate practices could validate
itself. Recognizing the corporation’s association with self-governing author-
ity establishes that the desire for this governance, not simply fundraising,
led to the adoption of the corporation for settlement activity. Corporate
governance practices had created imperium in imperio. An emphasis on these
governance practices, rather than on the legal corporation, helps explain
why colonies without corporate charters nonetheless adopted the gover-
nance structure of governors, councils, and assemblies. Long before the
Revolution, these offices and practices lost their association with the cor-
porate form and became instead symbols of self-governing authority and
the foundation of American institutions. With the seventeenth-century cor-
porate charters no longer representing Crown delegation of authority but
independent self-government, Connecticut and Rhode Island would later
retain them as new state constitutions.
The Proprietary Colony
Because post-Revolutionary American government resembled the prac-
tices of the corporation colonies, proprietary governments often have been
11 R.I. Colony Recs., 2: 24 (Mar. 1, 1664).
12 Petition of Edward Randolph (Aug. 9, 1687) in Robert Noxon Toppan, ed., Edward
Randolph; including his letters and official papers . . . (Boston, 1899), 4: 166.
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neglected. Yet, the proprietary form represented an equally plausible
approach to delegating governance authority. Englishmen interested in the
settlements viewed the invention of the proprietary form as an improve-
ment over the corporation colony; proprietaries achieved real settlement
success. Nova Scotia (1621), Avalon (1623), Maryland (1632), and Maine
(1639), as well as Carolina (1663), New York and New Jersey (1664), Penn-
sylvania (1681), and East Jersey (1682), all followed the proprietary form.
The coexistence of settlements with authority delegated through corpo-
rate governance practices and those with authority delegated to individual
feudal proprietors indicates the absence of preconceived notions about the
appropriate manner of government for colonies.
Although we tend to think of the charter as emblematic of democratic
constitutionalism, the term charter first appeared in the early proprietary
grants. The proprietary form involved governing practices under which an
inheritable proprietorship was given by the Crown to a nobleman, a cohort
of titled lords served as councilors, and a dependent assembly assented to
legislation. The proprietor acquired social status as the highest lord and
the economic privilege of collecting quitrents (in essence, rents or taxes
on land). His political authority was similar to the English palatinates of
Durham and Chester; the social aspiration came from idealized English
manorial society.
The impetus for proprietary charters seems to have arisen both from
frustration with the corporation and the feudalistic aspirations of a few
noblemen. The oft-forgotten Sir Ferdinando Gorges played an important
role. Since 1607, Gorges had been involved in the failed colonial ven-
tures of the Plymouth Company. In 1620, he abandoned the corporation
approach and had the Company restructured as the “Council . . . for the
planting, ruling, ordering, and governing of New-England” (the Council
for New England). The Council was in form a board of proprietors, made
up of noblemen and gentlemen. It held constitutionally limited lawmak-
ing authority and granted land to Gorges, Council members, and friends.
Some grants were never used and reverted; others did not prove particularly
successful.
Although the Council’s grants did not prosper, others adopted the idea of
proprietary settlements. In 1621, a Scottish nobleman, Sir William Alexan-
der, obtained a charter from James I and the Scottish Privy Council naming
him hereditary Lieutenant General over Nova Scotia (New Scotland). The
charter, the first so described, gave Alexander extensive powers so long as
the laws were “as consistent as possible” with those of Scotland. Alexander’s
was a feudal vision: he established a Scottish-style feudal order, planned to
raise money by creating hereditary Knights-Baronet, and obtained a coat
of arms. By contemporary standards, Nova Scotia was successful, surviving
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until the early 1630s when the settlement was evacuated pursuant to a
French agreement.
The proprietary approach was of interest to men who were rising in
the ranks of the nobility through service to the King. In 1623, James
granted letters patent for the Province of Avalon (Newfoundland) to his
Secretary of State, Sir George Calvert – later to become Lord Baltimore
and a Catholic convert. Calvert had already been involved in the Virginia
Company and the Council of New England. The Avalon patent granted
him the most extensive governance authority residing in any individual in
England other than the Crown by granting him the powers of the Bishop
of Durham. Avalon failed when Calvert found the weather too cold. The
proprietary grant over the Caribbee (Barbados, the Leeward Islands, and
others) obtained by James Hay, recently elevated to Earl of Carlisle, in
the late 1620s was initially more successful, prevailing over the corporate
scheme of Courteen and Associates.
During the 1630s, proprietary grants continued to vest broad govern-
ment authority in a proprietor. In 1632, Calvert’s son Cecilius acquired
a Latin “charter” granting Maryland “forever,” responding in part to his
desire to found a settlement for Catholics. The charter established a palatine
province in which the proprietor controlled the courts and possessed law-
making authority limited only by the “Advice, Assent, and Approbation”
of the freemen and the familiar repugnancy provision. In 1634, Catholic
and Protestant settlers landing in Maryland laid out manors, parishes, and
hundreds, with quitrents paid to the proprietor. In 1639, Gorges acquired
similar letters patent for the Province of Maine. Gorges’s narrative described
the patent as a “Royal Charter,” implicitly distinguishing the direct Crown
delegation from the Council of New England’s subsidiary “patents.” Gorges
envisioned an idealized England and began to settle Maine with borough
towns and cathedral cities. His death in 1647, however, ended the propri-
etary.13
For the first half-century of settlement, the corporation and proprietary
coexisted as different approaches to the problem of delegating governance
and authority. In the 1640s, English political developments led Parliament
to reject the chartered proprietary with its cultural associations of lords,
dependent assemblies, and noble titles. Parliament’s sole new charter was
given to Rhode Island as an incorporated political body. This shift toward
legislative authority and Protestantism left the Maryland proprietary and its
charter vulnerable to charges of religious intolerance. In 1649, the assembly
13 Ferdinando Gorges, “A Brief Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advance-
ment of Plantations . . . ” (posthumously published 1658), in Sir Ferdinando Gorges and
His Province of Maine (Boston, 1890), 2: 65.
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and the newly appointed Protestant governor, William Stone, assented to,
and in 1650 the proprietor confirmed, an act permitting a certain degree
of “conscience in matters of Religion.” Despite the act, in 1652, the family
lost control of the proprietary to Parliamentary commissioners.
Parliament had been quick to reject the proprietary form, but the restored
Crown did not perceive it as an affront to Crown authority. Hence the Re-
storation revived proprietary grants and returned Maryland to the Calverts.
Nor did the Crown bring an immediate end to corporate self-governance.
Between 1662 and 1664, Charles II incorporated Rhode Island and Con-
necticut while also granting proprietary charters for two huge provinces,
Carolina (stretching from Virginia to Florida) and an unnamed territory
(including New York, New Jersey, parts of Maine, Martha’s Vineyard, and
Nantucket). Because Charles would make no additional grants until the
1680s, these 1660s charters left governance by both proprietary and corpo-
ration once again apparently legitimate.
The Restoration grants confirmed the Crown’s willingness to give exten-
sive governing authority to proprietors. The 1663 Carolina charter was
given to eight lords. The multiplicity of proprietors made nonsensical the
grant of Bishop of Durham powers, but the proprietors were given constitu-
tionally limited lawmaking power on the assent of the assembly, authority
to grant titles and incorporate boroughs and leet manors, and the ability to
collect feudal quitrents. As in Maryland, the proprietors’ vision included a
degree of religious toleration. In the 1664 letters patent for territory later
known as New York, Charles did not technically name James, Duke of York,
as lord proprietor, but conveyed similar authority: “full and absolute power
and authority” to govern, limited only in that the laws be agreeable and
the Crown have the right to hear appeals. James’s own 1664 grant of New
Jersey to Carolina proprietors John Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret,
for the nominal yearly rent of a peppercorn and, if demanded, twenty nobles
(an old coin), reveals the same understanding of the proprietary. The two
men established proprietary governance, planned to collect quitrents, and
extended liberty of conscience to the province (declaring it the one principle
that the assembly could not alter). Proprietary practices involved lawmak-
ing authority in the proprietor, feudal rent collection, and some degree of
religious tolerance.
Initially, proprietors controlled lawmaking. In New York the “Duke’s
Laws” (1665) were likely prepared by Governor Richard Nicolls and legally
trained Matthias Nicolls. In Carolina, proprietor Anthony Ashley Cooper
and John Locke produced the “Fundamental Constitutions” (1670), out-
lining an elaborate feudal society, which legalized slavery and provided
liberty of conscience for believers in the public worship of God. Proprieto-
rial authority was diminished, however, by the growing cultural assumption
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Downloaded from Cambridge Histories Online by IP 136.167.3.36 on Fri Mar 20 15:30:42 GMT 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521803052.004
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2015
P1: JZP
9780521803052c03 CUFX175/Grossberg 978 0 521 80305 2 August 31, 2007 3:30
78 Mary Sarah Bilder
of the legitimacy of assembly authority. In Carolina, the proprietors failed
to persuade the Carolina assembly to assent to the Fundamental Constitu-
tions and they never became colony law. In New Jersey representatives of
one town rejected the proprietary altogether as “soe obscure to us that at
present we are ignorant what it is” and refused even to pay quitrents.14 The
New Jersey proprietary’s political difficulties only increased in the 1680s
after Berkeley’s share had passed into the hands of a group of Quakers and
Carteret’s share became held by twenty-four new proprietors. In 1683, even
the Duke of York was compelled to permit an assembly with lawmaking
power subject to governor and proprietor concurrence.
This late-seventeenth-century transformation of proprietary governance
is reflected in the final proprietary, the province and seignory of Penn-
sylvania given to William Penn by Charles II in a “Royall Charter” in
1681. Like other proprietors, Penn, a Quaker, provided religious toler-
ation of a sort (here for Quakers and other dissenting Protestants) and
planned to collect quitrents. Penn’s authority as lord proprietor, however,
was bounded by Crown and assembly. Penn’s charter did not include the
broad powers of the Bishop of Durham. Penn, instead, was to send his laws
to the Privy Council for confirmation or disallowance, permit appeals to
the Crown, follow Crown colonial policies, and keep an agent in London
to respond to Crown concerns. Although like earlier proprietors, Penn’s
1682 “Charter of Liberties” and frame of government attempted to have
the governor and council write legislation and the assembly simply accept
or reject it, by 1696 this approach was deemed no longer appropriate
to circumstance. The assembly took over lawmaking authority, propos-
ing and passing legislation subject to the governor’s veto and the Crown’s
disallowance.
What significance should we accord the proprietary form? From Canada
to the Caribbean, proprietors settled and governed a far larger area than
the corporation colonies. Landholding practices in the middle and southern
colonies long continued to reflect the proprietary’s feudal, manorial vision.
The proprietary’s ability to combine this vision of landholding with some
degree of religious tolerance reminds us that our association of religious
tolerance with democratic government is deeply contingent. Like the cor-
poration, governance under the proprietary produced a version of imperium
in imperio – but in this case the development of multiple authorities. This
approach, however, failed. Initial proprietor ascendancy was eroded by the
growth in the assembly’s lawmaking authority and the Crown’s desire for
direct governance. Faced with these dual challenges, almost everywhere
14 Middletown paper (1669), quoted in Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American
History (New Haven, 1937), 3: 147.
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the proprietor’s authority collapsed. Two proprietaries, Maryland and Penn-
sylvania, survived at least in name because of the intense commitment of
their founding families, but the proprietors per se came to hold little real
authority.
The Royal Colony
By the Revolution, most colonies had become royal colonies held directly
by the Crown. Conventional accounts often imply that the path to royal
dependency was straight and that the Crown pursued a strategic course,
limited only by colonial opposition. The institution of the royal colony,
however, developed over a century in fits and starts. In 1625, the Crown
proclaimed “there may be one uniforme course of Government, in, and
through Our whole Monarchie, That the Government of the Colonie of
Virginia shall immediately depend upon Our Selfe, and not be committed
to any Company or Corporation, to whom it . . . cannot bee fit or safe to
communicate the ordering of State-affaires.”15 But the Crown proved to
be inconsistent in following this policy. Despite sporadic efforts aimed at
Massachusetts Bay, not one other colony was reduced to dependency during
the reign of Charles I. What a uniform course of government and, equally
important, colonial dependence actually looked like remained unclear for a
century.
Policy after the Restoration depended on the Crown’s political advisor
and his vision. Sir Edward Hyde, the Earl of Clarendon and Lord Chan-
cellor, sought increased colonial control but used existing mechanisms: a
Privy Council committee on the colonies was established in 1660, Vir-
ginia was given a seal proclaiming it the fifth royal dominion in 1663, and
a Crown-appointed governor and council were placed in Jamaica (seized
from Spain in 1655). New charters for Carolina (with Clarendon as a pro-
prietor), Rhode Island, and Connecticut followed traditional delegations
of authority. Crown commissioners attempted to end Massachusetts Bay’s
sectarian political practices and require conformity to English law, but the
Crown did not pursue their recommendation to revoke the letters patent.
After Clarendon fell from power in 1667, the Crown lost interest as it
dealt with problems caused by the Great Fire of London and war with the
Dutch.
In 1675, Sir Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Lord Treasurer, res-
urrected the idea of a uniform course of colonial government predicated
on Crown ascendancy. The new Committee on Trade and Plantations (the
Lords of Trade) initiated changes in lawmaking to make colonial laws the
15 Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations, 53.
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enactment of the Crown instead of the assemblies. In 1676, the Crown
rejected a proposed Virginia charter affirming assembly lawmaking power
subject only to review by the Crown and instead issued new letters patent
that placed Virginia in “immediate Dependance upon the Crowne of Eng-
land” without mention of an assembly.16 In Jamaica, the Lords attempted to
impose Crown lawmaking modeled on English control over Ireland. In New
England, Edward Randolph cited numerous grounds on which to revoke
the corporate charters, including violations of the laws of England, refusals
to take oaths or permit political participation of members of the Church
of England, denial of appeals to the Crown, and the obstruction of trade
laws.
Colonial opposition and Danby’s fall from power meant that the Crown’s
attempt to take over colonial lawmaking went nowhere. Crown efforts to
exert greater control turned instead to creating limits on colonial lawmak-
ing authority by developing means to enforce the rhetoric of repugnancy
and agreeableness to the laws of England, which avoided the difficulty and
drama of quo warranto proceedings. Thus when, in 1679, the Crown estab-
lished a royal province in New Hampshire with a Crown-appointed pres-
ident and council, the assembly’s power was constrained by requirements
that the president and council approve laws and that the Privy Council
have an opportunity for review. Bermuda was similarly restructured after
quo warranto proceedings permitted a new colonial government under a
royal governor in 1684 – a move initially welcomed by colonists tired of
the company. The Massachusetts charter was vacated in somewhat similar
fashion and Massachusetts and Maine placed in theoretical dependency on
the Crown.
Charles’s death in 1685 halted the process in some confusion, leaving
Massachusetts without a charter and Rhode Island and Connecticut as
the only remaining corporation colonies. The accession of James, Duke
of York, again altered the Crown vision of colonial government and royal
dependency. Consistent with James’s policies in England, the colonies were
envisaged as a small number of large dominions, with diminished assembly
lawmaking authority. James’s own proprietorial colony of New York was
merged with East and West Jersey, Massachusetts (and Plymouth), New
Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, and Connecticut into a new Dominion
of New England to parallel the old southern dominion of Virginia and the
huge Carolina proprietary. The governor-in-chief, Sir Edmund Andros, was
16 Grant from Charles II (Oct. 10, 1676) in John Burk, The History of Virginia, from its
settlement to the present day (Petersburg, 1804–1816), 2, Appendix, xl–xli; Virginia Colonial
Records Project 578, § 2582, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia
(www.virtualjamestown.org/virtjam6.html).
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given constitutionally limited lawmaking authority and required to send
laws to the Crown for approval. By 1688, Andros obtained the charters of
the Jerseys and Rhode Island, although Connecticut’s eluded him, hidden
allegedly in an oak tree. Andros faced opposition throughout, however, and
in 1689 the Dominion of New England collapsed amid local uprisings and
the overthrow of James II.
Crown policy on the colonies changed yet again under William of Orange
and his wife, Mary (James II’s daughter). More accepting of Parliamentary
authority, the Crown now confirmed colonial assembly power while main-
taining Crown supervision. In 1691, Massachusetts Bay received a “Royall
Charter” in which the Crown appointed the governor, and the freeholders
elected the assembly and the twenty-eight assistants of the governor’s coun-
cil. Assembly control of the council limited the royal governor’s legislative
control, but the assembly was still required to send laws to the Crown for
approval. Privy Council appeals could no longer be prevented, but jurisdic-
tion was limited to personal actions, permitting the colony for decades to
deny appeals over real property disputes. New York, meanwhile, was given
a Crown-appointed governor and council, an assembly, and Privy Coun-
cil review of legislation. The Jersey proprietaries, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island had their charters returned. Pennsylvania was returned to William
Penn after a brief period of Crown rule arising from Penn’s political trou-
bles. Maryland fared less well under a Protestant Crown unhappy with
its Catholic proprietors. Although the proprietary technically remained,
the Crown acquired the power to appoint and instruct the governor and the
Privy Council gained the power to review legislation and hear appeals. The
Crown’s overall approach to supervisory authority was confirmed in 1696
with the creation of the Board of Trade.
The trend to uniformity in Crown policy created a perception that the
proprietary and corporate charters made those colonies exceptional. In par-
ticular, the corporate governments appeared to make repugnant laws, refuse
appeals, and flout the trade acts. They harbored pirates, coined money, com-
peted with English goods, and did not take care of their own defense. In
1701, the Board of Trade recommended that the charters “be re-assumed to
the Crown; and those colonies put into the same state and dependency.”17
Proprietors and corporation governments sought to reduce their charters’
vulnerability by voluntarily responding to inhabitant and Crown concerns.
Penn’s “Charter of Privileges” (1701) affirmed legislative power in the uni-
cameral assembly. Colonial lobbying and the death of William in 1702 put a
stop to a pending revocation bill, but a new bill to create colonial uniformity
17 State of Government under the Plantations (1701), Proceedings and Debates of the British
Parliaments respecting North America (Washington, 1927), 2: 401.
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through royal appointments and appeals appeared in 1705, during Queen
Anne’s reign. This bill failed too. Nevertheless, Rhode Island and Connecti-
cut decided to permit appeals to the Privy Council and Connecticut even
voluntarily sent occasional laws over for review.
The Crown did not reduce any additional colonies to dependency by
direct policies after 1700. Nonetheless, disagreements ended proprietaries
that had multiple proprietors. In 1702, the Jersey proprietors surrendered
governance to the Crown while maintaining rights to the land. In Carolina,
the proprietors’ shares became embroiled in inheritance disputes, and res-
idents petitioned the Crown to revoke the charter. In 1720 after a local
revolution, the Crown appointed a royal governor in South Carolina and
insisted on approving the governor for northern Carolina. In 1729 it repos-
sessed the proprietary charter.
With the accession of George I, antagonism to the remaining charters
quieted after another effort to recall them failed in 1715. That year, the
Crown restored the Maryland proprietary to Charles Calvert, the Protestant
great-grandson of Cecilius Calvert. In Pennsylvania, the Penns also retained
their proprietary and even appointed governors (technically deputy gover-
nors) into the 1770s. In Rhode Island and Connecticut, the corporation
governments remained intact even after the Revolution. Uniform govern-
ment in the colonies was never completely achieved. Nevertheless, amid
the variety a common denominator form emerged: a local assembly holding
constitutionally limited lawmaking authority and overseen by either Privy
Council appeal or review.
In 1732, the last charter granted by the Crown confirmed the emergence
of this form of governance, in the process replaying the long history of set-
tlement practices as if it were an institutional teleology. Initially, the Crown
had delegated its governing authority to private individuals, as corporations
or proprietors. The Georgia charter thus incorporated a group of trustees as a
“body politic and corporate.” The “corporation” of trustees, in turn, elected
a council that appointed a governor, subject to Crown approval. After set-
tlement, however, the Crown was to have supervisory governance returned
to it. The Georgia corporation would therefore dissolve after twenty-one
years, and the Crown would thereafter appoint the governor. The manner
of government under the future royal governor did not have to be stated:
he and the assembly would pass laws, and the Privy Council would review
laws and appeals to ensure no repugnancies to the laws of England.
In 1701, the anonymous author of An Essay upon the Government of the
English Plantations noted that if “any Alterations in the Government of the
Plantations are necessary, they may be much more easily done now they
are in their infancy, than hereafter when they grow more populous, and
the Evils have taken deeper Root, and are more interwoven with the Laws
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and Constitutions of the several Colonies.” Alterations in government were
indeed done more easily in infancy. Unfortunately, by 1701, the govern-
ment of the colonies was already well on the path to maturity. Every passing
decade embedded common denominator governance practices more firmly
and rooted colonial government into the colonial constitution. The failure
to reduce the colonies to complete dependency before 1701 – indeed, the
failure of the Crown even to develop a uniform idea of what constituted
colonial dependency – would quietly become England’s biggest problem.
English efforts in the 1760s to impose dependency on this colonial consti-
tution led toward revolution.
II. GOVERNING SETTLEMENTS
By the early eighteenth century local governance in the English colonies
depended on relations among the governor and council, the assembly, and
the Privy Council. Of course, more immediate authorities governed ordi-
nary inhabitants’ daily life. Local subdivisions – towns in New England,
counties in the middle colonies, parishes in the Carolinas – governed the
community by recording real estate and contract transactions, making pro-
bate determinations, imposing minor fines and penalties, dividing land,
surveying highways, and policing poor and dependent individuals. Reli-
gious associations and institutions governed religious behavior. Male heads
of households governed wives and children. White masters governed inden-
tured servants and enslaved Africans, African Americans, and Indians. Com-
pacts and treaties between English settlers and the Native American tribes,
as well as intercolonial commissions and confederations, governed relations
among the colonies and with their neighbors. Although all these forms
of governance are important, here I focus on the transformation of settle-
ment governance from its somewhat haphazard beginnings to a theoretically
coherent, surprisingly effective, transatlantic colonial system.
The Governor and Council
We often assume the office of governor predated settlement. Although the
origins of the office remain unclear, the word did not originally mean colony
leader. At times, it referred descriptively to the one who governs, and at
other times it signified a specific official, such as the governor-general of
a garrison. The use of the term governor in the settlement context seems
to reflect the early influence of the trading corporations that usually had
a governor, deputy governor, and assistants, all elected by the assembled
generality. But even among early corporate ventures the title given to the
chief executive officer varied. Raleigh’s 1589 venture referred to a governor
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but the 1606 Virginia letters patent had no such reference, whereas the
1607 Sagadahoc venture had a president. The term “governor” often seemed
generic, as in the “Governor or principal Officer” of the 1609 Virginia letters
patent. By the 1630s, however, governor was becoming the preferred term
in corporate and proprietary colonies, and by the Restoration it was the
dominant term. Almost all post-Restoration charters had a governor, and
later Crown instructions named appointees as the Governor in Chief.
Historians’ focus on the legislature has left the governor’s importance
often unstated. The governor symbolized the location of supreme author-
ity in the settlement. In the colonies that followed corporate practices, the
inhabitants selected the governor. In Plymouth, the men “chose, or rather
confirmed, Mr. John Carver (a man godly and well approved amongst them)
their Governor for that year.”18 In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island, the general assembly elected the governor. In proprietary colonies,
the proprietor appointed the governor or held the position himself. The
Crown’s gradual attempt to acquire more authority over the colonies con-
centrated on controlling the governor. In the 1660s, Charles II unsuccess-
fully encouraged colonies to request new charters with Crown gubernatorial
appointment. Later, James II made Edmund Andros Captain General and
Governor in Chief of the Dominion of New England. Under William and
Mary, the 1696 Navigation Act required that governors nominated by
proprietors be approved by the Crown. By the 1720s, only Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and, to a certain degree, Pennsylvania remained outside this
system of royal governor appointment and control.
Selecting the governor symbolically demonstrated authority and rein-
forced loyalty to that authority. Into the eighteenth century, corporation
colonies repeatedly elected the same few prominent local residents who had
a vested interest in the success of the colony, often because of their large
landholdings or extensive mercantile assets. In the proprietaries, appoint-
ments reflected varying theories of authority. Maryland favored Calvert
family members. Pennsylvania chose English or Welsh officers and colonial
administrators, though many switched loyalties and died in the colony. In
Virginia, early Crown appointments favored local residents, but by the late
1670s Crown governors usually came from the English military and other
colonies. Francis Nicholson, for example, had served in the English army
and then in the Dominion of New England. Appointed lieutenant gover-
nor of Virginia (1690–2), Nicholson then became Governor of Maryland
(1694–8), Virginia (1698–1705), and South Carolina (1721–5). Although
New England governors’ loyalties often remained in the colony, southern
18 William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647, ed. Samuel Eliot Morrison (New
York, 1952), 76.
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royal governors like Nicholson began to exemplify the emergence of career
interests in the English colonial system and the development of aspirations
for a uniform colonial policy.
Governors rarely acted alone, instead serving with a deputy and council.
The office of deputy governor or lieutenant governor was ill defined, its
duties ambiguous and varied across the colonies. The council’s precursors
lay in the broad array of English advisory institutions, ranging from borough
councils to the trading company councils to the Privy Council. Certain New
England settlements initially used the term magistrate for council members,
but in corporation colonies the term assistant predominated. Councilor, with
its English governmental associations, was preferred in the proprietaries.
With the exception of Massachusetts, in colonies under Crown control,
governors nominated councils of twelve inhabitants. Royal instructions
required these members “be men of good life and well affected to our
government and of good estates and abilities and not necessitous persons or
much in debt.” The council advised the governor, sat as a court, composed
the upper house in bicameral assemblies, and consulted in certain colonies
on judicial and other appointments.
The office of governor was all important. Early governors physically
founded their settlements; their absence often doomed the settlement. The
thirty-six instructions given to Virginia Governor Sir Thomas Gates in
1609 indicate the extensive expectations placed on governors. Gates was
to sail the fleet to Jamestown; take control of public records; appoint,
consult, and dismiss counselors; ensure worship of the Church of England;
befriend and try to convert the native peoples; use martial law and chancery
power; make laws; settle a principal seat, build a fort and additional towns;
encourage trade; oversee employment; search out additional commodities;
oversee meals; keep track of letters and instructions from England; listen
to all opinions and objections; and keep secret sealed documents.
Instructions to later royal governors demonstrate the same breadth of
authority and obligation. They held the power of appointment, oath, and
oversight over other governmental branches. They were not to assent to laws
that circumvented disallowance requirements, affected trade or shipping, or
prejudiced the prerogative or property of subjects. They had discretionary
powers ranging from the discouragement of drunkenness to the licensing of
printing presses. They oversaw escheats, collected quitrents, and supervised
the value of currency. In commerce, they assisted admiralty and customs
officers, aided the royal navy (for example, by enforcing laws to preserve
trees for masts), enforced the laws regarding the plantations trade, and
encouraged the Royal African Company’s monopoly over the slave trade.
They were heads of the military, empowered to assist other colonies, but not
to declare war except against “Indians upon emergencies.” They promoted
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the established Church of England, encouraged the conversion of “Negroes
and Indians to the Christian religion,” and permitted religious liberty of
various degrees (in some colonies without restriction; in others to all but
“Papists”).19
Governors became conduits for Crown authority and flows of information.
They surveyed and transmitted maps. They wrote reports relating to popu-
lation, colony affairs, and injuries to English subjects by other nations. They
wrote accounts of judicial and other governmental functions, of finance, and
of commercial imports and exports (including the numbers and prices of
slaves imported). Although governors in royal colonies tried to follow the
written commissions and instructions that specifically defined their powers
and duties, governors in corporation colonies spent time trying politely and
cleverly to refuse to comply with Crown requests.
Governors also supervised colonial law. The governor and council initially
possessed significant lawmaking authority. In early settlements, particularly
in the proprietaries and royal colonies, governors authored or helped draft
legislation. Assembly lawmaking power and bicameralism would eventu-
ally reduce this direct power over legislation, whereupon governors resorted
to the veto, used powers to summon and dissolve the assembly, and sent
controversial laws to the Privy Council for disallowance. By the early eigh-
teenth century, the governor, possessing only indirect control over lawmak-
ing, appeared nevertheless to be a bar to legislation.
Into the eighteenth century, governors retained judicial authority
through which they might try to control the interpretation of laws. In
every colony, the governor and council initially sat as the central court.
Over time, a growing caseload converted the governor and council to a
court of appeal in many civil matters. The governor’s judicial authority
over equity was particularly controversial because that control was seen as
symbolizing supreme authority. In royal colonies and certain proprietaries,
the governor and council sat as a chancery court under the theory that equity
fell within the Crown’s prerogative power. Crown lawyers interpreted the
Massachusetts royal charter as retaining equity courts under the Crown
prerogative and therefore barring the legislature from appointing equity
judges. In Pennsylvania, the assembly and governor fought over who held
this equitable authority. The corporation colonies remained controversial
exceptions by insisting that supreme equitable authority lay in their assem-
blies.
19 For royal instructions, see Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Instructions to British Colonial
Governors, 1670–1776 (New York, 1935), 2 vols.; for Gates’s instructions, see David B.
Quinn, ed., The Extension of Settlement in Florida, Virginia, and the Spanish Southwest (New
York, 1979), 212–18.
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The Assembly
We should not take the existence of the assembly for granted, for the idea
that the governed should participate in governance was somewhat unusual.
In English boroughs and palatines, the assembled governing body was usu-
ally referred to as a council. An assembly was a more representative gather-
ing with self-governing authority. Early English trading corporations held
assemblies (general courts) to enact bylaws; for example, the Presbyterian
Church of Scotland had been organized by a general assembly. In 1619, the
first colonial lawmaking gathering in Virginia adopted the term, referring
to itself as a “General assembly.” Specific local variants appeared (Virginia
had a House of Burgesses and Massachusetts Bay had a General Court) but
most colonies and Crown instructions referred to a general assembly. The
term remained ambiguous, however, with assembly referring to the assem-
bly of governor, assistants, and deputies, as well as only the lower branch of
the legislature. Over the seventeenth century, the assembly in both senses
established its existence by gaining lawmaking authority.
Once assemblies began to appear, they quickly became part of colonial
government. In Virginia and Bermuda, the assemblies that convened in
1619 and 1620 likely brought some stability to local relationships. The
Maryland proprietary charter provided for an assembly of freemen that
would help frame laws; such an assembly met possibly as early as 1635.
In 1639, the Crown officially recognized the Virginia assembly in royal
instructions. Parliamentary control during the Interregnum strengthened
colonial assemblies, and the Restoration did not have a significant adverse
effect on them. James, Duke of York, did not include an assembly in his
plans for New York, but one met in 1683. By then, Crown instructions
generally assumed the presence of assemblies.
As representative institutions, assembly composition ran the theoretical
gamut. The early freemen in Massachusetts Bay were also largely officers; the
general court thus tended to duplicate the council. In Maryland, all freemen
were initially summoned to the assembly. The need to make government
work for the inhabitants altered both approaches. In Massachusetts, the
complaints of ordinary landholders led to enlargement of the class of freemen
electing deputies. In Maryland, freemen desiring to avoid attendance at the
assembly developed an informal proxy system among themselves. Maryland
would shrink participation to elected representatives. By the 1640s, rep-
resentatives in most settlements were elected from towns or other defined
localities. Inhabitants’ concerns about governance also prompted a shift to
bicameralism, which was dominant by the end of the seventeenth century.
Representatives of towns, burgesses, or counties sat in the lower house;
members of the governor’s council sat in the upper house. Pennsylvania
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remained an exception with an explicitly unicameral structure. Regardless
of structure, elections were seldom contested before the end of the seven-
teenth century.
The idea that assemblies should exercise lawmaking authority was also
accepted rapidly. In corporation colonies, the assembly was recognized as the
supreme lawmaking authority. In the proprietaries, the assemblies’ author-
ity over lawmaking was initially more limited, the Maryland charter simply
requiring the “Advice, Assent, and Approbation of the Free-men” or “their
Delegates or Deputies” to laws made by the proprietor. By the end of the
seventeenth century, however, assemblies were generally exercising signif-
icant lawmaking authority. The Crown’s failed attempt in the late 1670s
at imposing lawmaking on Jamaica and Virginia only confirmed assembly
authority over law.
The Privy Council
The role of the Privy Council (strictly, the King in Council) in colonial gov-
ernance took a century to cohere. The first Virginia patent gave the Crown
a brief direct role, but otherwise early letters patents provided no formal
part, leaving the Crown to address issues through private petitions and
complaints. During the mid-1630s, a permanent committee on trade and a
commission on foreign plantations were created. The latter, under William
Laud, theoretically enjoyed broad powers over the colonies – the power to
make laws, hear cases, and revoke charters and patents – but it accomplished
little. During the 1640s and 1650s, Parliamentary leaders passed the first
Navigation Act regulating colonial trade, sent commissioners to the settle-
ments, and began to review laws from the Barbados. Coherent governance,
however, did not occur, and various standing committees went in and out
of existence.
After the Restoration, the Privy Council turned to colonial matters, in
particular, disputes over the array of patents, charters, grants and indentures
doled out over the past eighty years. This role was explicitly acknowledged
in the 1663 Rhode Island charter, which permitted appeals to the Crown
in matters of public controversy. In private matters, for which discontented
individuals in New England had long argued for a right to appeal under
Crown prerogative or English corporate law, the Privy Council also began
to consider a formal role. In 1664, letters patent to the Duke of York for the
first time explicitly reserved to the Crown the hearing of private appeals.
The same year the Privy Council sent an investigatory commission to New
England. But the commission foundered and the Crown was distracted from
its concern over colonial affairs by more pressing foreign policy matters.
Efforts to create a coherent and cohesive role for the Privy Council devel-
oped after 1676 with the creation of the twenty-one-member committee
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known as the Committee for Trade and Plantations (the Lords of Trade). At
first the committee aspired to a direct role in colonial lawmaking. Since the
1660s, laws had been sent from Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands,
and, on occasion, Virginia for sporadic review; the committee now pro-
posed drafting laws for the Jamaican assembly itself. The effort failed and
by 1680 the English attorney general had confirmed that Jamaica would
be governed by laws made by its own assembly. The committee settled for
a supervisory role. Instructions to the Caribbean and Virginia governors
and to John Cutt, president of New Hampshire, required the transmis-
sion of laws so that the Privy Council could review them. By the 1680s,
the committee was also hearing appeals from the colonies. In 1681, the
Pennsylvania charter became the first both to require transmission of laws
and to reserve explicitly the Crown’s right to hear appeals. Between 1682
and 1692, such supervision spread by royal instruction and new charter to
Virginia, the Dominion of New England, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Maryland.
At the turn of the century, the Privy Council began to decide in spe-
cific instances whether colonial laws and customs fell outside the bounds
of an imperial conception of English law and customs. In 1696, it cre-
ated a new advisory committee of the whole, the Committee for Hearing
Appeals from the Plantations. The Crown established the separate Lords
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (the Board of Trade), composed
of state officers (initially the chancellor, president, treasurer, high admiral,
secretary of state, and chancellor of the exchequer) and eight appointed and
paid commissioners, usually members of Parliament, to advise as to colonial
laws among other duties. The approach proved effective and would remain
largely in place through the eighteenth century.
Review of colonial legislation and appeals was an intriguing approach
to supervising colonial law. The Crown could claim ultimate authority and
ensure uniformity while still permitting local authorities to pass legisla-
tion, decide cases, and diverge from English law in the first instance. After
1690, more than 8,500 acts were submitted for review from the main-
land colonies, with approximately 470 disallowed. Between 1670 and the
Revolution, around 250 cases were appealed from the mainland American
colonies, with Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Virginia accounting for the
largest number. Laws found repugnant to the laws of England or contrary
to the royal prerogative touched on inheritance (diminishing primogeni-
ture, limiting dower rights, treating jointly held property as tenancy in
common); escheats to the Crown; relief of debtors; religious establishment
and religious toleration (or the lack thereof); assembly authority and powers;
regulation of attorneys; creation of courts (particularly equity, chancery, and
admiralty courts), juries, and court procedures; trade and piracy regulation;
and the creation of ports and regulation of custom officers. Yet, most colonial
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laws remained in force without any action from the Privy Council. Colo-
nial legislatures nonetheless manipulated disallowance by passing tempo-
rary laws or reenacting substantially similar laws, notwithstanding Crown
instructions intended to prevent such evasions.
Appeals of cases provided another avenue for Privy Council decision
making as to whether a colony’s law was repugnant to the laws of Eng-
land or a permissible departure for local circumstances, although it was
more costly and dependent on individual initiative. In theory the Privy
Council heard appeals as a committee of the whole. In reality the appeal
was usually assigned to a smaller group, including either the Chief Justice
of King’s Bench or Common Pleas. Colonists retained English solicitors
and Crown law officers (often the Solicitor or Attorney General) to argue
the appeal. Between 1696 and 1720, civil, criminal, probate, and vice-
admiralty appeals were brought from Massachusetts, New York, Virginia,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, New Hampshire, South Carolina,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
Theoretically, Rhode Island and Connecticut stood outside this sys-
tem. Their corporate charters did not authorize Privy Council review or
appeals. Throughout the 1690s the Crown and various colonists repeatedly
tried to bring the colonies under the review regime, only to receive messy
manuscript copies of laws from Rhode Island and a twenty-year-old edition
of Connecticut’s statutes. Eventually, in 1715, the English Attorney Gen-
eral declared that the two colonies had no obligation under their charters to
transmit laws. In the 1730s, however, Connecticut would do so voluntarily.
The colonies were less successful at barring appeals, the Board of Trade pro-
claiming that appeals were an inherent right of the Crown. Despite local
legislative efforts to discourage them, appeals were heard from Connecticut
and Rhode Island. Appeals became particularly prevalent in Rhode Island
as the only path for review of laws.
By the eighteenth century, the Privy Council had become the third
branch of colonial government. Law – both its making and interpretation –
involved the governor, legislature, and the Crown’s Privy Council. Rather
than an early example of separated powers, colonial government was thus
the English theory of mixed powers – Crown intertwined with legislative
authority, known as the King in Parliament – extended to the far side of
the Atlantic.
III. THE CULTURE OF LAW IN THE SETTLEMENTS
The manner and offices of colonial government depended on a culture of law.
The term legal culture has become ubiquitous in contemporary scholarship
even as the concept itself remains elusive. Rather than attempt a definition,
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I want instead to plumb a component of colonial legal culture – the world
of courts, attorneys, and law – in the expectation that an understanding of
the meanings that came to be attached to them can suggest avenues for the
broader inquiry into legal culture in general
Courts
We often discuss early seventeenth-century colonial courts as if they were
a separate branch of government. They were not. The institutional names
of courts – the General Court or Quarter Court (Virginia), the Court of
Assistants (Massachusetts and Connecticut), the General Court of Trials
(Rhode Island), the General Court of Assizes (New York), and the Provincial
Court (Maryland and Pennsylvania) – prove misleading. The composition
of all these courts was the same: they were all made up of the governor
and council. Some might dismiss these courts as “courts” because many
of the judges had not trained as attorneys, but to do so is historically
inappropriate. Procedurally, the jury usually made decisions, and judges
decided issues raised on motion by attorneys. Traditional legal training
was unnecessary for the entire bench. Questions were resolved according
to colonial laws, legal records, or English instructions (to which judges as
political officers had access). The job of attorneys – and likely any legally
trained judges – was to explain any additional English laws. Should there
be disagreement, by the end of the seventeenth century the Privy Council
(also, as we have seen, comprised of political officers) heard appeals. Because
many cases turned on whether a colonial law or practice was repugnant or
agreeable to England, political acumen was as valuable as formal study in
addressing the question, and political power and status were as potent as a
degree in ensuring respect for the answer.
The courts arranged below and above these courts in the early settlements
were not separate branches either. The diversity of early inferior courts par-
alleled local political structures: there were county courts (Massachusetts),
town courts (Rhode Island), and manor courts (parts of New York and Mary-
land). After 1660, county courts became the common inferior court across
the colonies. Justices of peace (in many places, the members of the gover-
nor’s council) served as justices, as well as often handling immediate, local
problems on an individual basis. Despite the possibility of an appeal, many
matters never moved beyond these courts. Above the governor and coun-
cil court, in several early colonies – Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, and even Maryland – was the assembly that heard cases and
appeals as a court. The theory behind this jurisdiction was most apparent
in the corporation colonies in which the legislature was seen as the supreme
colonial authority.
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The Crown’s growing desire for control over law altered this system. In
the 1680s, the Crown began to end where it could the assembly’s jurisdiction
as the highest court of appeal in favor of appeal to the Privy Council from the
colony’s court. New and recurring disputes over the existence and authority
of other colonial courts with jurisdiction over probate, chancery, fines and
recoveries, admiralty, and arbitration reflected this same fight for control
between the Crown (usually in the guise of the royal governor) and the
legislature.
This struggle produced the oft-claimed ancestor of modern supreme
courts, the Superior Court of Judicature, comprised of an appointed chief
justice and associate justices. This transformation should not be miscon-
strued as the separation of the judicial function from colony government; to
the contrary, it was an effort to retain Crown control of the judiciary, as well
as an acknowledgment of the time constraints placed on the governor and
council by growth of the colonies. The new court structure appeared in the
Dominion of New England in 1687 and in 1681 in Jamaican legislation.
After 1691, Superior Courts of Judicature soon sat with judges appointed
by the royal governor in New York (technically the Supreme Court of Judi-
cature), Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. A Superior Court
of Judicature heard appeals and had original jurisdiction in cases involving
title to land or significant amounts of money. County sessions and inferior
courts of common pleas heard smaller cases. This new terminology spread
to Connecticut (1711) and Rhode Island (1729), although the legislature
retained the power to appoint justices. Although Pennsylvania adopted a
Supreme Court in 1722, most southern colonies retained the names of gen-
eral or provincial courts and left power in the governor and council, either
directly or by appeal.
The absence of published court opinions reinforced the perception that
courts were not a separate branch. Most proceedings remained solely of
local interest and included prosecutions for fornication, disputes over title
to land, disagreements over inheritances, contested debts, and accusations
of slander. Knowledge of the court was acquired by being in court, relying
on the oral or written reports of others, and reading the manuscript records.
When court proceedings appeared in print they reflected public interest in
the substantive matter and a printer’s hope for financial return. William
Bradford printed the court proceedings in the West Jersey trial and execu-
tion of Thomas Lutherland for murder under the title Blood Will Out (1692),
as well as legal materials relating to a controversy involving himself and
Quaker George Keith. Other early printed legal materials include Cotton
Mather’s account of five of the Salem witch trials, accounts of Jacob Leisler’s
rebellion, Nicholas Bayard’s trial for treason, and a significant number of
piracy trials. Apparently unique was the printing in 1720 of copies of the
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briefs in a Massachusetts civil case, Nathaniel Matson v. Nathaniel Thomas,
involving the question whether Massachusetts had to follow the English
law of primogeniture and entail. Descriptions of courts nonetheless occurred
in official correspondence and printed descriptions and discussions of the
colonies. From a transatlantic perspective, what the courts governed seemed
less important than who governed them.
Legal Practitioners
We have tended to assume that relatively few lawyers were to be found in the
seventeenth-century colonies. Certainly most criminal defendants entered
the court unrepresented, and many litigants in lower courts proceeded
without attorneys. In 1705, Robert Beverley of Virginia wrote, “Every one
that pleases, may plead his own Cause, or else his Friends for him, there
being no restraint in that case, nor any licensed Practitioners in the Law.”
Yet, attorneys, legal practitioners, and other legal literates abounded in the
colonies. Their presence necessitates reconsideration of the seventeenth-
century colonies as a world of law without lawyers.
Throughout this period, attorney or practitioner of law was the preferred
label; lawyer was the preferred epithet. In every colony, court records,
statutes, letters, and other documents demonstrate that people labeled
as “attorneys” appeared early and often. In England, the term attorney
had become ubiquitous between 1550 and 1650. Practitioner referred to
these attorneys, along with clerks and solicitors. Attorneys conducted rou-
tine matters in central, local, and chancery courts; composed pleadings;
gave advice; prepared litigation; and served as clerks of the court. Early
seventeenth-century law books were aimed at these legal practitioners. Over
the course of the early seventeenth century, attorneys became differentiated
from barristers. Barristers were more likely to be from elite social circles,
instructed at one of the Inns of Court. Only barristers could argue issues of
law before King’s Bench or Common Pleas. Nonetheless, this distinction
was still developing during the early decades of colonial settlement.
Legal practitioners abounded in the early colonies, both in number and
variety. Some had English legal training. Before 1660, a significant number
of attorneys practicing in the colonies had been trained as attorneys or
barristers or had studied in the Inns of Court. Familiar with English law,
such men played a crucial role in writing early colonial legal codes in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York. English-trained
practitioners also served as early critics of colonial divergences from English
laws. A second group of legal practitioners was comprised of men who
held political offices that involved the law: recorders and clerks, general
attorneys, governors, and members of councils. In 1649, because people had
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asked magistrates (councilors) for advice in cases that later went to trial,
Massachusetts prohibited such a practice. For similar reasons, after 1670,
colonial acts prevented clerks, sheriffs, constables, deputies, and justices
of the peace from practicing law. A third group of practitioners can be
labeled simply as legally literate. Written literacy, combined with speaking
skills and basic legal knowledge, permitted competent participation in the
legal system despite the absence of formal training. Some legal literates
acted as attorneys; others limited themselves to representing themselves,
friends, associates, or dependents. Merchants comprised one category of
legal literates because the skills needed for transatlantic business and law
overlapped.
Women appeared as attorneys, representing themselves, their husbands,
or other family members. Although these appointments have been described
as “attorney-in-fact” appointments, the phrase was not used, and the distinc-
tion between attorneys-in-fact and those in-law seems a later development.
Female attorneys may have often had the same knowledge and skill as male
legal literates, although they could not serve in political office. The social
response to female practice is unclear. In Maryland in the 1650s, Margaret
Brent famously served as an attorney while a single woman. She litigated
cases, served as executrix for the previous proprietor, and, in that capacity,
unsuccessfully sought to vote in the assembly as the proprietor’s attorney.
In 1658, a Maryland proclamation barred wives from acting as attorneys
for their husbands. The eventual spread of licensing procedures may have
significantly limited the number of female attorneys. Women nonetheless
continued to serve as executors, suing to collect debts, arranging property
transfers, and defending estates against claims.
After 1660, a new generation of legal practitioners arose, many of whom
acquired their legal training in the colonies. Law schools did not exist, and
the colleges that had been established, like Harvard, did not train lawyers.
Attorneys were, in essence, home-schooled: sons learned from fathers, aspir-
ing practitioners served as clerks or studied with prominent attorneys, and
practicing attorneys shared English law books and commonplace books of
notes. Some practitioners continued to seek English legal training. Men
from Massachusetts and Virginia on occasion traveled to England to spend
time at the Inns of Court. Though the Inns no longer provided a com-
prehensive educational experience, attendance provided an opportunity to
purchase English law books, observe at the courts, and learn about the
law through available avenues. Barristers, members of the Inns of Court,
attorneys, solicitors, and clerks could also be found among the waves of
new English and Scottish migrants. Some started colonial practices; others
served in the offices of the expanding royal governments, for example, as
judges in the vice-admiralty courts.
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Although the colonies never acquired the hardened barrister-solicitor
distinction of English legal practice, colonial legal practice did have a hier-
archy. By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a small group
of attorneys in each colony monopolized practice in the superior courts. In
Maryland, five or six attorneys handled most legal matters, with several
attorneys arguing 90 to 100 cases apiece. Perhaps to prevent litigants from
literally monopolizing such attorneys, Rhode Island and New York had
statutes attempting to limit parties from hiring more than two attorneys.
Colonies set fees based on the court and the type of legal work. The supe-
rior court practice involved appeals and disputes over the application of
the laws of England – and generated higher fees. In the early eighteenth
century, prominent attorneys advocated for even higher fees for cases argued
on appeal and with numerous pleadings on matters of law. These men also
began to consider forming associations to seek fee and attorney regulation.
In 1709, six prominent “practisers of the law” in the City of New York
formed an association to lobby for fee alterations. The ability to acquire
higher fees permitted some of these attorneys to earn their living from legal
practice. 20
Provisions barring attorneys were few. Of the laws that were passed,
most focused on fees. In Massachusetts’ Body of Libertyes (1641), number 26
stated that “Every man that findeth himselfe unfit to plead his owne cause
in any Court shall have Libertie to imploy any man against whom the Court
doth not except, to helpe him, Provided he give him noe fee or reward for
his paines.” The provision, however, was not included in the 1648 printed
Laws and Libertyes. Carolina’s Constitutions stated that “it shall be a base and
vile thing to plead for money or reward,” but the Constitutions were never
adopted. In the 1640s and 1650s Virginia did bar attorneys from receiving
fees – but it also repealed these laws and at times insisted that parties be
permitted to have men plead their case when necessary. It is unclear, in
short, whether fee prohibition had any real impact.
Instead of prohibiting attorneys, colonies began to regulate their behav-
ior. Statutes sought to prevent misuse of the legal system. The Massachusetts
Laws and Libertyes discouraged the “common barrater” who was “vexing
others with unjust, frequent and endles sutes” and permitted treble dam-
ages against litigants who had “willingly & wittingly done wrong” to the
defendant. Virginia and Maryland made early efforts to license attorneys;
after 1670, several colonies required that attorneys be admitted by the
governor or the courts. In 1666, attorneys in Maryland took the oath of
attorney before admission to practice. In 1686, Massachusetts adopted a
20 Paul Hamlin and Charles E. Baker, Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of New York,
1691–1704 (New York, 1959), 1: 273 n. 27.
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version of the fifteenth-century English attorney oath, and over the next
three decades New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, and South Carolina followed. The colonies also occa-
sionally sought to regulate attorney argument. A 1682 Maryland statute
insisted that attorneys should “speak distinctly to one Error first” before
proceeding to the next. In 1736, Rhode Island attorneys tried to bar those
from Massachusetts in part because they “tire the ears of the judges with
their needless repetitions, and sometimes confound and perplex the juries
with their circumlocutions and sophistry so as to obscure and darken the
case more than if it had not been pleaded at all.” In 1718 the colony had
required that at least one retained attorney be a colony resident.21
Several colonies provided attorneys for defendants who appeared dis-
advantaged by self-representation. In 1647, Virginia permitted courts to
appoint a man to plead a cause if the party might otherwise lose the case by
his “weakeness.”22 That same year, Rhode Island allowed litigants to plead
their own case or use the town attorney. Some statutes even required that an
attorney take any case for which a fee was presented. Although English law
barred defendants in felony cases from retaining attorneys, Rhode Island in
1669 and Pennsylvania in 1701 authorized indicted defendants to retain
attorneys. Although colonial legislatures understood the problems with
attorneys – excessive litigation, excessive fees, excessive talking – they also
seem to have understood that attorneys could aid people in negotiating
authority and protesting illegitimate governance.
Colonial Law
In 1701, the anonymous “American” author of An Essay upon the Government
of the English Plantations noted, “It is a great Unhappiness, that no one can tell
what is Law, and what is not, in the Plantations.” The relationship between
the laws of England and the laws of the colonies was uncertain. Some thought
that the law of England was “chiefly to be respected.” Some “are of Opinion,
that the Laws of the Colonies are to take the first place.” Others “contend
for the Laws of the Colonies, in Conjunction with those that were in force in
England” at the time of settlement and those where the “Reason of the Law”
is applicable to the colonies. A final group held that no acts of Parliament
21 Archives of Maryland: Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, October 1678–
November 1683 (Baltimore, 1889), 7: 361; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic
Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire (Cambridge, 2004), 118 (quoting 1736
Petition).
22 Colony Laws of Virginia, ed. John D. Cushing (Wilmington, 1978), 2: 349.
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bound the colonies unless particularly named. The author suggested that
“some Rule be established, to know what Laws the Plantations are to be
subject to” and how far Parliamentary acts not mentioning the colonies did
“affect them.” Until then, “we are left in the dark.”
People had been in the dark about what was “law” in the colonies for
a century. The existence of the question itself was proof of the ambiguity
over the location of lawmaking authority. Non-English areas controlled
by England certainly existed before settlement of the American colonies,
but there was no uniform approach to when English laws governed. In
Ireland, the English Crown essentially could write laws for Ireland. Under
Poynings’ law (1495), legislation was to be approved by the English Crown
and Privy Council before being passed by the Irish Parliament. In Wales, an
English statute in 1535 replaced Welsh laws with the laws of England and
authorized the King and Council to reenact any necessary divergent Welsh
customs. In the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, customary Norman
law was followed, but the Privy Council had the right to hear appeals.
The requirement in the patents and charters that laws be “as near as con-
veniently they may be, agreeable” or not repugnant to the laws of England
created a foundation for debate. What this constitutional limit meant in
practice was unclear. Very early arguments over the application of English
law in the New England colonies approached the question as one of corpo-
rate law and discussed the authority under the patent. There was little else
to discuss. For most of the seventeenth century, English case law on what law
governed the colonies was largely unhelpful. Two cases discussing the rights
of Scots over land in England seemed to bear on the issue, but provided little
if any guidance. In Calvin’s Case (1608), Chief Justice Edward Coke estab-
lished a set of categories (inherited versus conquered kingdoms), but did
not explicitly discuss the question of the law in future American colonies.
The awkward fit of these categories for the mainland colonies was apparent
by 1624 when Coke and others considered the application of “conquest” to
the New England patent.23 Decades later, in Craw v. Ramsey (1670), Chief
Justice John Vaughan referred to the now existent “plantations”; however,
the case involved the ability of a dominion to alter English law in England,
not the application of English law in the colonies. Through the 1660s, the
focus of the colonial law question was whether a colony’s passage of plau-
sibly repugnant laws was sufficiently outside the colony’s charter to justify
quo warranto proceedings. In the 1670s, the Crown’s effort to write colonial
laws rendered the question almost moot.
23 Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America, ed. Leo Francis
Stock (Washington, 1924), 1: 58–61.
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In the early 1680s, the Crown’s acceptance of colonial assembly lawmak-
ing and the passage of new property laws in England shifted the focus to
whether new English statutes applied in the colonies. Of particular impor-
tance in the colonies, the Statute of Frauds (1677) altered the requirement
for a valid will from two to three witnesses. In the colonies where wills had
long been made with two witnesses, the new English statute threatened
to invalidate two-witness wills. The relationship of the requirement to the
colonies would be litigated repeatedly. In 1683, a Virginia case addressed the
issue of whether the Statute of Frauds applied. Virginia attorney William
Fitzhugh argued for invalidation of a 1681 two-witness will because the
“Laws of England are in force here, except where the Acts of Assembly have
otherwise provided, by reason of the Constitution of the place & people.”24
In England, however, Attorney General William Jones reached a different
conclusion, which was apparently shown “to all the then Judges of England,
Who declared the same to be the Law.” Jones stated that the colonies were
only bound by new statutes if expressly named. Jones explained that Par-
liament could not have considered “the particular circumstances and con-
ditions of the plantations, especially considering no Member” came from
there to Parliament. Moreover, the Atlantic meant that colonists would
not know of the law until after it took effect. In short, Parliament was not
expected to include the colonies in ordinary legislation, and the colonial
legislatures were the more appropriate lawmaking authorities.25
The common law was an even trickier matter. In the 1690s, cases involv-
ing English colonial officers in the Caribbean continued to debate when the
laws of England applied. In King’s Bench, Blankard v. Galdy involved the
sale of the Provost Marshal of Jamaica’s office for seven and a half years and
whether a sixteenth-century English statute barring the practice applied
in Jamaica. Chief Justice John Holt concluded that Jamaica had been con-
quered, and therefore the laws of England were not in force until so declared.
Because Jamaica had been conquered from the Spanish, the case’s applica-
tion to the seemingly not conquered mainland colonies was unclear. The
House of Lords appeal, Dutton v. Howell, involved a dispute between the
governor of Barbados, Richard Dutton, and the executors of John Witham,
his deputy governor, for Dutton’s alleged false imprisonment of Witham.
Among other arguments, Dutton claimed that the action could not lie
because the laws might be different in Barbados. The executors responded
that Barbados was a “colony or plantation” and that the common law must
24 Richard Beale Davis, ed., William Fitzhugh and His Chesapeake World, 1676–1701 (Chapel
Hill, 1963), 107 (Fitzhugh to Ralph Wormerly, Feb. 26, 1681/1682).
25 Virginia Colonial Decisions: The Reports by Sir John Randolph and by Edward Barrandall . . . ,
ed. R.T. Barton (Boston, 1909), 2: B1–2.
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apply in a “new Settlement” of Englishmen. The executors lost, despite
elaborate argument and without explanation. The cases did not provide an
answer, but confirmed the contemporary difference of opinion.
Into the eighteenth century, as the anonymous author had complained,
no one in the colonies or England could “tell what is Law, and what is
not, in the Plantations.” Given the lack of clarity, certain colonies sought
their own rules as to when laws of England would apply. One approach is
probably best referred to as an introduction statute, authorizing English
law in appropriate circumstances. For example, in 1700, the Rhode Island
assembly declared that, where the colony’s laws or customs did not reach
or comprehend a matter or cause, it was lawful to put into execution the
laws of England. The introduction of English laws then could be made on
a case-by-case basis by courts and officials depending on local conditions.
A second approach adopted in South Carolina in 1712 and North Carolina
in 1715 resembled later reception statutes. Here, the colony transferred
various English statutes into its own law and thereby ensured that certain
laws could be pleaded in the courts.
The idea that colonies might be more properly considered new settle-
ments than conquered territories gathered support in the early eighteenth
century. A new publication of Blankard in William Salkeld’s Reports (1718)
claimed that Holt had declared that in “an uninhabited Country newly
found by our English Subjects,” the laws in England were in force. A 1720
opinion by Richard West, counsel for the Board of Trade, agreed that the
common law and statutes in affirmance prior to settlement were in force as
well as later statutes that mentioned the colonies. A 1722 memorandum
recounted a Privy Council determination of a colonial appeal apparently
from Barbados that similarly distinguished conquered countries from unin-
habited countries found out by English subjects who brought their laws
with them.26 Nonetheless, a report of Smith v. Brown and Cooper, a slav-
ery case, contained a statement by Holt that “the laws of England do not
extend to Virginia, being a conquered country.” As debates between the
proprietor and the Maryland assembly and the instructions from Connecti-
cut to its agent in the 1720s demonstrate, people continued to disagree over
the cases, the rules, and the factual history of the colonies – whether they
were plantations in countries found out by English people or conquered
lands.
26 Mr. West’s opinion on the admiralty jurisdiction, in the plantations (1720), George
Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers on Various Points of English Jurisprudence (1814; New
York, 1971), 2: 202; Memorandum (1722), Peere Williams, Reports (London, 1740), 2:
75–6.
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In 1729, an opinion by the English Attorney General further complicated
matters. Earlier comments had implied that a colony assembly had to enact
post-settlement English law before it applied. The opinion concluded that
a colony could introduce such an English statute by assembly act or receive
it by “long uninterrupted usage or practice.” Colonial custom and practice,
in particular, the degree to which English laws had been followed, became
an additional debatable issue.
These arguments about the application of the laws of England to the
colonies, as well as the requirement that colonial lawmaking be not repug-
nant to the laws of England, depended on knowledge of the laws of England.
Desirable English law books, therefore, were those that described the “laws
of England.” The phrase was broad and ambiguous, but seemed to include
at its core the Magna Carta, English statutes, and the principles and terms
of English common law. In selecting law books, colonial legal attorneys
favored texts that provided comprehensive overviews of English law and
were designed for general practitioners. Treatises, particularly on such
subjects as property and inheritance, offered comprehensible discussions.
Statute collections such as Pulton’s Sundry Statutes or Keble’s Statutes at Large
provided convenient access to English statutes. Guides for justices of the
peace and jurors succinctly described the court system. Form books such as
the Compleat Clerke provided necessary models for legal documents, and law
dictionaries explained vocabulary. More popular than case reports them-
selves were abridgments of reports; a unique interpretation of an English
case had little value. More unusual books related to legal issues of partic-
ular interest in the colonies: for example, charters, oaths, the liberties of
Englishmen, and divergent English customs. Early colonial publications
emphasized these same areas and included a book on indictments brought
against the Duke of York; a treatise on Parliamentary laws and customs; a
book including Magna Carta and the charter to William Penn; and reprints
of books on the right to juries, on inheritance, and guides for constables and
sheriffs. In the early 1720s, Boston and Philadelphia printers both published
English Liberties; or, the Free-born Subject’s Inheritance, a volume including the
Magna Carta, fundamental laws, and comments relating to the “Constitu-
tion of our English Government.” As these books were bought, borrowed,
and copied into commonplace books, a colonial vision of the laws of England
spread.
Adding to the uncertainty over the nature of colonial law was ambiguity
over the lawmaking authority present in the colonial legislatures. We tend
to gloss over the words used in colonial lawmaking – acts, ordinances,
laws, statutes – but they could convey subtle and important differences.
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, for example, noted that the laws were
“expressed onely under the name and title of Liberties, and not in the exact
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forme of Laws or Statutes.” However, it “intreate[d]” authorities to “consider
them as laws.” As the author of An Essay upon the Government of the Plantations
pointed out, it was uncertain “how far the Legislature is in their Assemblies.”
Were the colonial assemblies little more than corporations or did they have
the power of “Naturalization, Attainder of Heirs, cutting off Intails, settling
Titles to Lands, and other things of that nature”? Colonial criminal laws
seem to have been of particular concern, and a better understanding of this
issue may help explain the tendency of New England assemblies to cite
biblical sources for criminal laws. The author also wanted to know whether
“they may make Laws disagreeable to the Laws of England, in such Cases,
where the Circumstances of the Places are vastly different, as concerning
Plantations, Waste, the Church, &c.” Colonial assemblies accepted this
justification. The South Carolina “Negro-Act” (1740) thus explained that
crimes that gave a “Slave, Free-Negro, Mulatto, Indian or Mestizo” the death
sentence were “peculiar to the Condition and Situation of this province,
[and] could not fall within the Provision of the Laws of England.”27
The form in which colonial laws appeared similarly reflected shifting
uncertainties about authority. A printed collection of laws testified publicly
and permanently as to the location of government and lawmaking authority.
Although most colonies required laws to be read publicly or sent to towns
and churches, a printed volume offered constant access for literate readers
on both sides of the Atlantic. This accessibility thus also posed a danger – a
printed law book could provide evidence that colonial laws were repugnant
to the laws of England and bring about quo warranto proceedings. Before
1648, the only authoritative collection of printed colonial laws was For the
colony in Virginea Britannia. Lavves diuine, morall and martiall, &c. (London,
1612), a collection written and imposed by the governors. Although John
Cotton’s An Abstract or the Lawes of New England (London, 1641) appeared
with extensive biblical citations, the collection represented his own draft and
was never adopted by the assembly. The code bearing a closer resemblance
to the assembly’s laws, Nathaniel Ward’s Body of Liberties (1641), remained
in manuscript and was never technically adopted.
The corporation colonies’ growing confidence in their lawmaking author-
ity resulted in printed law collections that testified to that authority. Mas-
sachusetts Bay was the first and only colony that domestically printed its
laws before the 1670s. The Book of the General Laws and Libertyes (Cam-
bridge, 1648) appeared the year before Charles I’s execution as English
27 “An Act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in this province,”
[Acts passed by the General Assembly of South-Carolina, May 10, 1740–July 10, 1742]
[Charleston: Printed by Peter Timothy, 1740–1742], 3, 9 (Early American Imprints,
Series I (Evans), nos. 40211, 40286).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Downloaded from Cambridge Histories Online by IP 136.167.3.36 on Fri Mar 20 15:30:42 GMT 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521803052.004
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2015
P1: JZP
9780521803052c03 CUFX175/Grossberg 978 0 521 80305 2 August 31, 2007 3:30
102 Mary Sarah Bilder
politics shifted away from Crown authority. The volume emphasized the
general court’s authority. Yet, the edition had a short life, as by 1651 leg-
islative changes left it judged “unvendible,” largely turned to “wast pap’r”
and burnt.28 The assembly published a new version of the Laws and Liber-
tyes in 1660 and continued to print later session laws. In 1672 and 1673,
the corporate governments of Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut
had Samuel Green of Cambridge print their laws with title pages that
emphasized the “General Court,” not the Crown or England, and opening
pages that addressed the “Inhabitants” and “Freemen” of the colonies. In
Virginia, the Crown-appointed governor used printed laws to promote a
different authority. His collection for Crown officials, The Lawes of Virginia
Now in Force (London, 1662), prominently displayed the King’s name on the
title page and proclaimed Crown as well as assembly authority. Amidst con-
troversies over colonial authority, printed laws declared legislative authority
to inhabitants and to England. Edward Randolph used the printed laws to
demonstrate repugnancies to Crown officials, and the Connecticut edition
was sent to London as evidence. To avoid such scrutiny, Rhode Island never
printed its laws in the seventeenth century.
In the 1690s, colonial law printing began to flourish as the relationship
between Crown and assembly became clarified. The Crown’s requirement
that colonies send laws to England for review and acceptance of assembly
lawmaking authority combined to produce the laws of their “Majesties”
provinces: New York (1694) New Hampshire (1699), and New Jersey
(1709). As the threat to the charters receded, corporation and proprietary
colonies also printed laws. Early editions of proprietary laws appeared in
Maryland and Pennsylvania in 1700–1. Between 1714 and 1720, these
two colonies, along with Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire,
New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, published official versions. The
Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts editions carefully acknowl-
edged both English and local authority. With the title pages declaring in
small print his or her “Majesties Colony,” the charter appeared as the first
document. Rhode Island nonetheless remained wary and silently altered cer-
tain laws to conform to current English laws. The southern royal colonies
were curiously slow in printing official collections: Virginia (1733), South
Carolina (1736), and North Carolina (1751). Despite the growth in printed
collections, as the author of An Abridgement of the Laws in Force and Use in
Her Majesty’s Plantations (London, 1704) noted, gentlemen concerned with
the plantations had “great Difficulty” in procuring copies of the laws to
compare “the Laws and Constitutions of each Country, or Province, one
28 Petition of Richard Russell (1651), The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (Cambridge,
1929), viii (Max Farrand introduction).
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with another.” The question, what is law in the colonies, remained difficult
as a theoretical and practical matter.
CONCLUSION
A century and a half after the question was asked, “What manner of gov-
ernment is to be used,” the settlements had produced one answer. In the
two corporation colonies, two proprietaries, and remaining royal colonies, a
governor served as translator for Crown policies, an assembly held the law-
making authority limited by the requirement of non-repugnancy to the
laws of England, and the Crown through the Privy Council supervised the
boundaries of colonial authority.
What manner of government was this system? English settlement prac-
tices had created a government of dual authorities, legitimizing both Crown
and colonial legislative authority. Acceptance of these dual authorities per-
mitted colonial governance to successfully negotiate the geographic prob-
lem of the Atlantic. Although these dual authorities were in tension, they
were not perceived as incoherent. By the mid-eighteenth century, how-
ever, as William Blackstone demonstrated, English political thought had
become rhetorically intolerant of dual authorities. He wrote that “there is
and must be” in all governments “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncon-
trolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty,
reside.” Blackstone placed this “sovereignty of the British Constitution” in
Parliament – the King, the Lords, and the House of Commons.29
For colonial lawyers, this construction threw into confusion two hun-
dred years of settlement governance. As James Wilson, in Considerations on
the Nature and the Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament
(1774), wrote, “Dependence of the Mother Country” – of allegiance to the
Crown – was understood “by the first planters of the Colonies, and also by
the most eminent Lawyers, at that time, in England.” It was, however, a
“dependence founded upon the principles of reason, of liberty, and of law”;
not the “slavish and unaccountable” dependence and “unlimited authority”
contended for by the Parliament. This understanding of dependence – dual
authority created by supervised, constitutionally limited lawmaking – pro-
duced the Revolution and the commitment to federalism. Perhaps in this
sense, institutional history helps us better understand an American manner
of government.30
29 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769; reprint,
Chicago,1979), 1: 49, 51.
30 James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and the Extent of the Legislative Authority of the
British Parliament (Philadelphia, 1774), 29, 31, 34.
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them to Native American practices. Alvin Josephy, The Patriot Chiefs: A Chron-
icle of American Indian Resistance (New York, 1961), is also somewhat dated, but
its complex explanation of conflict touches on legal concerns. Many of these
books are regional and therefore have small sections on native customs that
enter the legal arena: Nancy Bonvillain, Hiawatha: Founder of the Iroquois Con-
federacy (1992), gives a chronology, whereas Dennis Brindell Fradin, Hiawatha:
Messenger of Peace (1992), focuses on the Iroquois Confederacy and includes the
debate about whether or not the Confederacy had an influence on the U.S.
Constitution. Other regional histories include general books, such as Esther K.
Braun and David P. Braun, The First Peoples of the Northeast (Lincoln, NE, 1994),
that touch briefly on law. Local nonfiction books for secondary-school readers
such as Keith Egloff and Deborah Woodward, First People: The Early Indians of
Virginia (Charlottesville, VA, 1992), have sections on Virginia’s ethnohistory.
Few books on Native Americans written for general audiences or high-school
students touch on law, but those that do almost always deal with it only in the
modern period.
Methodology
In few fields is methodology as important or diverse as in the study of Native
American legal history. Of significant importance to many scholars of Native
America is a book in legal anthropology, Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai’i:
The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton, NJ, 2000). Indeed, much of Merry’s work,
including earlier books that had nothing to do with indigenous peoples, has
had an influence on the way legal historians of Native America have conducted
their research. Nancy Shoemaker, ed., Clearing a Path: Theorizing the Past in
Native American Studies (New York, 2002), is a substantial addition to how to
do Indian history.
Emerging from studies of law and politics are also inquiries into the colo-
nial period’s usefulness to understanding the present; for example, Kirsten
Matoy Carlson, “Is Hindsight 20–20?: Reconsidering the Importance of Pre-
Constitutional Documents,” American Indian Law Review 30 (2005).
Conclusion
One finds a growing literature on Native American law in the colonial period
appearing in journal articles, but books on the subject are still few. No book
has considered Native American law in its broad spectrum for the colonial and
revolutionary periods. It is therefore necessary to turn to scholarly journals,
collections of essays, and collections of primary sources to find materials.
chapter 3: english settlement and local governance
mary sarah bilder
The scholarship addressing the early settlement and governance of the early
colonies is very extensive. The following works provide good general discussions
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or bibliographies of more specific relevant materials or are particularly worthy
of attention. Many of the scholars mentioned here have written so widely and
prominently that space precludes discussion of more than a fraction of their
work. Readers are urged to use this essay as a point of departure for their own
more extensive bibliographic research.
The best starting point for colonial institutional history remains Charles M.
Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1934–
1939). Herbert L. Osgood’s work – The American Colonies in the Seventeenth
Century, 3 vols. (1904; Gloucester, 1957) and “England and the American
Colonies in the Seventeenth Century,” Political Science Quarterly 17 (1902),
206–22 – contains useful details. Merrill Jensen’s introductions in American
Colonial Documents to 1776 (New York, 1955) deserve wider attention. W. Keith
Kavenagh’s Foundations of Colonial America, 3 vols. (New York, 1973), contains
an excellent collection of primary documents and introductions, and Donald
S. Lutz’s Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History
(Indianapolis, 1998) offers a nice shorter collection. Good overviews of colonial
institutional history appear in T. H. Breen & Timothy Hall, Colonial America in
an Atlantic World (New York, 2004); Richard Middleton, Colonial America: A
History, 1585–1776 (2d ed., Oxford, 1996); and Alan Taylor, American Colonies
(New York, 2001). For particular colonies, the volumes of A History of the
American Colonies (1973–1989) have excellent bibliographies.
Overviews of the historiography can be found in Christopher L. Tomlins,
“Introduction,” in Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., The Many
Legalities of Early America (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 1–23; William E. Nelson,
“Legal History before the 1960’s,” in William E. Nelson and John Phillip
Reid, eds., The Literature of American Legal History (New York, 1985), 1–32;
and Stanley N. Katz, “The Problem of a Colonial Legal History,” in Jack P.
Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., Colonial British America (Baltimore, 1984), 457–83.
Two region-specific articles are Richard J. Ross, “The Legal Past of Early New
England: Notes for the Study of Law, Legal Culture, and Intellectual History,”
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 50 (1993), 28–41, and Warren M. Billings,
“Seventeenth-Century Virginia Law and its Historians, with an Accompanying
Guide to Sources,” Law Library Journal 87 (1995), 556–75. Good bibliographic
essays appear in Peter Charles Hoffer, Law and People in Colonial America (rev.
ed., Baltimore, 1998) and Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American
History (New York, 1989).
On the trading companies, see Cecil T. Carr, ed., Select Charters of Trading
Companies (1530–1707) (London, 1913); George Cawston and A. H. Keane,
The Early Chartered Companies (A. D. 1296–1858) (London, 1896); and Maud
Sellers, ed., The Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company (London, 1906).
Vol. I, ch. 8 and Vol. II of William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of
English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 (1910–1912; New York,
1951) have a fine analysis of the organization of the joint-stock company and the
early settlement companies. For background on the forms, see Shelagh Bond and
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(1952–1953), 47–51; Charles Deane, “The Forms in Issuing Letters Patent by
the Crown of England,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1869–
1870, 11 (1871), 166–96. On corporate governance in England, useful recent
discussions include Paul D. Halliday, Dismembering the Body Politic: Partisan Pol-
itics in England’s Towns, 1650–1730 (Cambridge, 1998); Catherine F. Patterson,
Urban Patronage in Early Modern England: Corporate Boroughs, The Landed Elite,
and the Crown, 1580–1640 (Stanford, 1999); and Patrick Collinson and John
Craig, eds., The Reformation in English Towns, 1500–1640 (New York, 1998).
Most colonial charters are in the seven-volume The Federal and State Con-
stitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and
Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States, ed. Francis N. Thorpe (Wash-
ington, DC, 1909; online version available through Yale University’s Avalon
site). For an interesting discussion of charters and prerogative powers, see Eliza-
beth Mancke, “Chartered Enterprises and the Evolution of the British Atlantic
World,” in Elizabeth Mancke & Carole Shammas, eds., The Creation of the British
Atlantic World (Baltimore, 2005), 237–62. On specific charters, see Tim Thorn-
ton, “The Palatinate of Durham and the Maryland Charter,” American Journal
of Legal History 45 (2001), 235–55, and Albert Carlos Bates, The Charter of
Connecticut: A Study (Hartford, 1932). On repugnancy, see Mary Sarah Bilder,
“The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 116 (2006), 502–
66, and Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the
Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788 (Athens,
GA, 1986), 19–42.
Published official English materials relating to the colonies appear in Acts
of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series (1908–1912; Buffalo, 2004),
vol. I, 1613–1680; vol. II, 1680–1720; and vol. VI, certain unbound papers;
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series (1860; reprint, Vaduz, 1964; available
on CD-ROM), vol. I, 1574–1660; Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal
Proclamations Relating to America, 1603–1783 (Worcester, 1911); Leo Francis
Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North
America (Washington, 1924; vols. I–III cover 1542–1727). The House of Lords
Journal and House of Commons Journal are available online. For unpublished
materials, Charles M. Andrews, Guide to the Manuscript Materials for the History
of the United States to 1783, in the British Museum, in Minor London Archives, and
in the Libraries of Oxford and Cambridge (Washington, 1908) and Grace Gardner
Griffin, A Guide to Manuscripts Relating to American History in British Depositories
Reproduced for the Division of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress (Washington,
1946) remain invaluable.
On the early settlement period, David Beers Quinn’s work remains the
standard, in particular, England and the Discovery of America, 1481–1620 (New
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York, 1974); The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1940;
Nendeln, 1967); Set Fair for Roanoke: Voyages and Colonies, 1584–1606 (Chapel
Hill, NC, 1985); The Roanoke Voyages, 1584–1590, 2 vols. (London, 1955); and,
with Alison M. Quinn, The English New England Voyages, 1602–1608 (London,
1983). The documents in his five-volume New American World: A Documentary
History of North America to 1612 (New York, 1979) are particularly fine. Recent
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most recently, Making Ireland British, 1580–1650 (Oxford, 2001), as well as
John McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The 1590s Crisis (Manchester,
1997). The relationship of the Irish experience to colonial law is elucidated in
David Thomas Konig, “Colonization and the Common Law in Ireland and
Virginia, 1569–1634,” in James A. Henretta et al., eds., The Transformation of
Early American History (New York, 1991), 70–92.
Of law and governance in the colonies, Virginia and Massachusetts have
received the most sustained scholarly attention. For a summary of older work,
see George Athan Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America: Selected
Essays (1965; New York, 1970). On Virginia, see the scholarship of Warren M.
Billings and David T. Konig: Warren M. Billings, “The Transfer of English Law
to Virginia 1606–50,” in K. R. Andrews et al., eds., The Westward Enterprise,
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Legacy of Colonial Law,” in Russell K. Osgood, ed., The History of the Law
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115. On Plymouth, see George L. Haskins, “The Legal Heritage of Plymouth
Colony,” in David H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Early American Law
(Chapel Hill, NC, 1969), 121–6; George D. Langdon, Jr., Pilgrim Colony:
A History of New Plymouth, 1620–1691 (New Haven, 1966), ch. 7; and, for
primary sources, see David T. Konig, ed., The Plymouth Court Records, 1686–
1859 and William Bradford’s Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647, ed. Samuel
Eliot Morison (New York, 1952). The materials on the Massachusetts Bay
colony are voluminous. On the companies and the vote, see Frances Rose-
Troup, The Massachusetts Bay Company and its Predecessors (New York, 1930)
and Ronald Dale Karr, “The Missing Clause: Myth and the Massachusetts Bay
Charter of 1629,” The New England Quarterly 77 (2004), 89–107. On law and
governance, classics include David Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan
Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629–1692 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979) and George
L. Haskins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts: A Study in Tradition and
Design (New York, 1960). The extensive scholarship is discussed well in Daniel
R. Coquillette, “Introduction: The ‘Countenance of Authoritie,’” in Daniel
R. Coquillette, ed., Law in Colonial Massachusetts, 1630–1800 (Boston, 1984),
xxi–lxii. The struggles over power in the 1630s in Massachusetts Bay are
analyzed in the works of Francis J. Bremer and Edmund S. Morgan; for example,
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Thomson: The Scottish Founder of New Hampshire,” The Scottish Genealogist
(June 1999, Sept. 1999, Dec. 2000) and Charles Deane, “Indenture of David
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ston, Gorges of Plymouth Fort (Toronto, 1953); Sir Ferdinando Gorges and His
Province of Maine, comp. James Baxter Phinney, 3 vols. (Boston, 1890); and Henry
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chapter 4: legal communications and imperial governance
richard j. ross
Historians of the early modern English, French, and Spanish empires have long
discussed how distance and slow, irregular communications affected metropoli-
tan oversight of New World colonies. They commonly treated communications
as one factor among many explaining the character of imperial governance and
colonial society. In the past fifteen years, some scholars have made commu-
nications the primary subject of study. They have traced the routes through
which messages passed; asked how the methods and personnel of information
exchange influence the creation, framing, and dissemination of knowledge;
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